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The Growth of Corporate Debt 
Leveraged"buyouts (LBOs) became increasingly popular 
during the !~80's. Investment banking firms grew adept at 
arranging them and investors channeled their money into 
junk bond funds'. The level of corporate debt rose from 
$965 billion in 1982 to $1.8 trillion in 1988, representing 
an increase from 32 percent to 37 percent of the u.s. gross 
national product in those six years (Greenwald, _1988). The 
household and'federal government sectors increased their 
holdings of debt from 52 percent of the u.s. gross national 
' ', 
product in 1980 to ,62 percent in 1987 and from 27 percent 
of the u.s. gross national product in 1980 to 43 percent in 
1987, respectively (Heinz, Congressional Hearings, 1989). 
Between the years 1984 and 1987 nonfinancial corporations 
retired a net $313 billion of equity and borrowed a net 
$613 billion of debt (Brady, Congressional Hearings, 1989). 
These are typical of the data used to explain the magnitude 
of the trend toward leverage. Not all of the debt"was LBO-
related, but the size of the debt issued in the course of 
LBO transactions drew attention. 
1 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
characteristics of firms that have undergone leveraged 
buyouts from 1980 through 1990. An empirical analysis 
using financial, economic, and descriptive variables will 
extend, complement, and synthesize previous research in the 
area. The objective of this study is to determine whether 
the purchasers of bought-out firms considered, at the time 
of purchase, the firms' abilities to withstand recessionary 
periods. It is important that this factor be weighed into 
a buyout decision. Failure to do so could lead to problems 
for acquiring firms during economic downturns if the firms 
are not able to service the debt acquired in the buyout. 
There is also a possibility of harm to the economy in 
general since bankruptcies of bought-out firms would be 
likely to have further impact due to multiplier, or ripple, 
effects. 
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Department of 
Treasury, described the growth in LBO activity as one 
result of a "fly-now, pay-later mentality", with great 
emphasis on the short-term and little concern about long-
term consequences. The investment community has 
traditionally placed more emphasis on current performance, 
as reflected in quarterly and yearly earnings reports 
(Brady, Danforth, Ruder, Kidder, Congressional Hearings, 
1989). Corporate managers take a short-term view, placing 
le~s emphasis on long-range planning. Managers are 
understandably reluctant to provide proprietary information 
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on long-term projects. Thus most of the publicly available 
information about firms is of a short-term nature. 
Brady has expressed concern with the growing use of 
corporate leverage and its potential impact on the nation's 
economy. Young talent and financial resources have been 
diverted for "financial engineering", while other nations 
have been planning for the future. Brady notes that past 
periods of economic growth were characterized by the use of 
savings to create new jobs, new products, and new services 
at lower prices. LBOs have produced fundamental changes in 
the financial structure of the nation's corporations. 
Brady contends that the economic future of the u.s. and its 
ability to remain competitive in a global economy are 
jeopardized. 
Although corporate debt-to-equity ratios rose sharply 
over the decade, the rates are not unprecedented for the 
United States economy, nor are they above the levels of 
some competitors, such as Japan. Even before the tax code 
provided incentives for holding debt, i.e. before World 
War I, debt-to-equity ratios were substantial (Summers, 
Congressional Hearings, 1989). However, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors Alan Greenspan 
argued in 1989 that the ability of firms to meet their 
interest payments has deteriorated. Low interest coverage 
ratios, as a result of heavier debt loads and interest 
burdens at the end of the 1980's, were more characteristic 
of past recessionary periods when weak profits had been the 
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culprit. The average corporate bond rating, based on 
Greenspan's large sample of firms, was "A-" in 1989 as 
compared to an "A+" average rating in the late 1970s. In 
his opinion this is a significant change, reflecting a 
decline in the underlying corporate debt quality. 
Greenspan's view is supported by research which indicates 
that the initial debt ratings of the acquiring firms in 
LBOs are often downgraded (Amihud, 1989; Marais et al., 
1987); also, these bonds often experience negative abnormal 
returns (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Marais et al., 1987; 
Travlos and Cornett, 1990). 
Along with a shift in attitudes toward the short run, 
there have been innovations in capital markets which make 
higher levels of debt possible. Historically, bonds were 
generally investment grade when issued, but may have become 
"fallen angels" through corporate misfortune (Brady, 
Congressional Hearings, 1989). Junk bonds are low grade 
when issued. The loan-sale market among banks for junk 
bond debt has developed substantially. In addition, the 
participation of foreign banks in u.s. markets has added 
liquidity to the low-grade ("junk bond") corporate debt 
market. This results in increased marketability. 
Therefore more investors are willing to hold junk bonds 
than would be the case if their marketability were highly 
restricted, as it had been in the past. 
A growth in arbitrage activity has added to the trend 
toward increased debt levels (Brady, Congressional 
5 
Hearings, 1989). At the suggestion that a corporation is 
being considered as a buyout target, arbitragers typically 
anticipate gains on the company's stock based on previous 
patterns for buyout target stocks. They may then enter 
into the market as buyers of significant numbers of shares, 
thus driving the stock's price up. The likelihood of a 
successful bid may be increased by the strong interest that 
arbitragers have in the stock. Potential sellers are 
inclined to act quickly due to their limited information 
and eagerness to sell while prices are up. Add substantial 
up-front transactions fees for investment advisors, 
brokers, underwriters, and LBO fund managers, with no long-
term risk involvement, and there are many groups with 
incentives to take a short-term view. 
Parties Involved in LBOs 
The effects of an LBO may concern not only parties who 
are directly involved, but also those indirectly affected 
by the impact on the economy as a whole. Typically the 
bought-out firm's new owners and the junk bond holders 
anticipate high returns. The firm's current shareholders, 
investment banks, commercial banks, and lawyers initially 
receive high rates of return on their investments of 
monetary or human capital. The firm's initial bondholders 
can expect a fall in the bonds' market value because they 
become much riskier as the firm drastically increases its 
debt level. u.s. taxpayers are affected indirectly; the 
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original stockholders pay taxes on their gains, but the tax 
deductibility of the interest payments on debt later will 
presumably lead to reduced collections of corporate income 
tax (Congressional Hearings, 1989; Newport, 1989; 
Greenwald, 1988). 
Employees of bought-out firms may have long-term or 
short-term adjustments to make as the corporate 
reorganization takes place. The AFL-CIO has several 
concerns about the potential negative impact of buyouts. 
The group estimates that mergers, takeovers, and LBOs over 
the past decade have directly led to about 90,000 of its 
members losing their jobs (Kirkland, Congressional 
Hearings, 1989). There may be negative effects for the 
communities in which the firms are located. Corporate 
assets and subsidiaries may be sold to reduce the debt 
load. There have been instances of companies' funds being 
used inappropriately to pay greenmail. New management may 
choose to terminate established bargaining relationships 
and to cancel collective agreements that have been made 
(Congressional Hearings, 1989). 
Senator Donald W. Riegle (Congressional Hearings, 
1989) cited the psychological effects of the LBO trend on 
investors and chief executive officers (CEOs), in terms of 
their taking a short-term view and having an increased fear 
of the company becoming a takeover target. 
Favorable Opinions About LBOs 
Opinions about the desirability of LBOs are varied. 
One view is that they are valid investment opportunities, 
providing a proper return for the level of risk involved, 
while dramatically increasing the efficiency of the firm. 
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Jensen's (1986) agency cost hypothesis states that 
going private may control the agency costs of free cash 
flow. Firms which have stable business histories, low 
growth prospects, and high potential for generating cash 
flow are seen as likely LBO candidates by Jensen. In these 
circumstances the agency costs of free cash flow are likely 
to be high. 
Surplus funds should be distributed to shareholders if 
firm value is to be maximized. But managers may choose to 
take on nega~ive net present value projects or retain 
excess funds to increase the resources under their control. 
Going private allows the firm to use its free cash flow 
more efficiently. 
In this case debt serves a control function in LBOs, 
with the interest payments to bondholders substituting for 
dividend payments to stockholders. The ensuing interest 
payments on debt may be an alternative to having used the 
free cash flow to pay dividends (Travlos and Cornett, 
1990). The buyout may be seen as having led to a 
liquidating dividend for stockholders, thus eliminating 
free cash flow and the agency costs associated with it. 
Further discussion of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis as 
applied to going private transactions can be found in the 
Harlow and Howe (1988) paper. 
Supporters of LBOs maintain that companies are better 
managed after the transaction, especially when managers 
have become owners of the firm. Prior to the buyout, 
management may have been inefficient and incurred high 
agency costs. It is not uncommon for the members of a 
corporation's board of directors to be friendly with 
corporate managers, and for members of the board to hold 
little financial stake in the corporation. In this 
situation the board of directors would give priority to 
management's interests rather than stockholders' interests. 
This would allow the incidence of agency costs that are 
higher than would be the case if management's sole focus 
were on benefiting shareholders. The LBO process may then 
be considered a disciplinary tool for management and 
directors that generate high agency costs. 
8 
David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange commission, points out that LBOs created 
significant wealth gains for u.s. stockholders during the 
1980s. Much of this wealth was ,~einvested in the 
securities markets, resulting in increased availability of 
financial capital. The SEC, of course, is mainly concerned 
with the adequacy of disclosure in LBO transactions, and 
not with who benefits or loses as a result of the 
transactions. 
not with who benefits or loses as a result of the 
transactions. 
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Some LBOs may be justified on the grounds that the 
bought-out firms are divisions of large corporations that 
the companies desire to sell. The conglomerate trend of 
the 1960s, during which disparate companies were assembled, 
is being reversed. A buyout of a firm's subdivision could 
result in more efficient operation of it and the remaining 
divisions of the firm due to the benefits of specialization 
in management and production.-
Unfavorable Opinions About LBOs 
An opposing belief is that LBOs result in excessive 
prices being paid for acquired firms at the expense of the 
losing parties including the firm's bondholders. It is 
well documented that there is a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to stockholders upon announcement of a buyout 
(Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Marais et al., 1987; Travlos and 
Cornett, 1990). 
There are also fears that the increase in corporate 
debt will increase firms' risk of bankruptcy, and that this 
elevated risk has the potential for worsening future 
recessions. Faust (1990) found that bankruptcy risk, as 
measured by firms' financial debt ratios, did increase 
during the 1980s, and that there was a dramatic rise in the 
number of business failures from 1979 through 1986. Some 
of the failures might have been explained by changes in 
bankruptcy laws in 1979, but the effects of this change 
should have been felt early in the decade and leveled off 
before mid-decade. 
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Faust (1990) also documents an increase in interest 
rate premiums (over ten year Treasury bonds) within a bond 
risk class relative to expansionary periods before the 
1980s. This supports the reported downgrading of bonds by 
rating services, reflecting the increase in bond riskiness. 
The primary concern of Faust (1990) and some 
government policy makers is that this increa,se in 
bankruptcy risk may increase the severity of the next 
economic recession. Firms facing cash flow difficulties 
tend to compensate by curtailing investment. Firm 
investment decreases by an estimated $.20 to $.40 for each 
$1.00 decrease in cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen, 1988). 
This type of reaction by troubled firms can extend to 
other firms that supply the troubled firms with raw 
materials, investment goods, or financial goods or 
services. Thus, a "ripple effect" could lead to a 
length'ier recession in the future because firms would not 
have the resources for investment if they find themselves 
in a cash flow squeeze. Reduced lending due to a decrease 
in credit worthiness resulting from cash flow problems 
would also heighten the impact. 
Another area of concern for the economy in general is 
the holding of junk bonds by financial institutions. Some 
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state insurance regulators have proposed restrictions on 
the extent to which insurance companies can hold such debt. 
Greenspan has looked at guidelines for federally chartered 
banks. In 1989 the Federal Reserve estimated that LBO 
loans comprised 9.9 percent of all commercial loan activity 
in large banks. Since banks generally issue secured debt, 
Secretary Brady pointed out that banks have fared pretty 
well in the LBOs that have gone sour to this point. But 
the effects during leaner economic times were still 
uncertain at the end of the decade. 
Some savings and loans (S&Ls), however, took on high 
risk investments, including junk bonds and mutual funds 
composed of junk bonds. Some parties see the S&Ls' junk 
bond portfolios as contributing significantly to the thrift 
crisis due to an erosion of the bonds' value. Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen sees this not as the main cause of the S&L 
problems, but as a marginal contributor to them. Ruder of 
the SEC has defended the holdings of junk bonds by 
financial institutions. His reasoning is that the 
purchasers are primarily sophisticated financial 
institutions, which thoroughly analyze the risk and return 
characteristics of the instruments. 
Many institutions have limits on the amount of equity 
they can have in their portfolios. Life insurance 
companies limit equity to a certain percent of the 
portfolio, and banks are not generally allowed to hold 
securities. But the characteristics of junk bonds are in 
many ways more like equity than like debt. Thus the 
regulatory limitations are circumvented when these 
institutions hold junk bonds. 
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Many financial analysts have predicted a decrease in 
the number of LBO transactions that may transpire in future 
years. It is possible that there was a "backlog of needed 
restructurings", in Greenspan's words, and that the 
mergers, acquisitions, and LBOs of the 1980s reduced 
inefficiencies substantially. But the question of the 
long-term impact of the trend remains to be answered. 
Perhaps the most disturbing factor is that a vast majority 
of the restructurings took place during a long period of 
economic expansion, and, as of the end of the decade, had 
not been tested by the trials of recession. Consequently, 
we cannot rely on past data to predict how well the parties 
involved and the economy in general will fare in the coming 
years. 
A particular concern" is whether the firms' purchasers 
are considering the possibility of an economic recession 
and the impact this could have on their ability to pay off 
the new debt. The new owners, which frequently include 
former managers, often plan to enact a reverse-LBO 
eventually, in which the firm goes public again. Therefore 
they would want to avoid bankruptcy. If the premium paid 
in an LBO does not reflect the cyclicality of the firm's 
cash flows and the industry(ies) in which it operates, then 
the debt load of the leveraged firm might be too large to 
avoid bankruptcy. The new owners need to protect their 
interests with regard to these factors so that the firm's 
cash flows will be adequate to service the debt acquired 
during the buyout. 
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Brady notes that a disproportionate share of LBOs 
occurred in industries that are considered to be relatively 
noncyclical and that have strong cash flows, which should 
be better able to support leverage. Several witnesses who 
testified before the Senate Committee on Finance hearings 
on leveraged buyouts and corporate debt indicated that they 
were cautious in their LBO dealings and considered such 
things as whether the bought-out firms could support the 
new debt levels. They looked at the companies' 
performances during past recessionary periods (e.g. 1974 
and 1981) to see what the impact was at that time. 
Kidder assured the committee that Kohlberg, Kravis, 
Roberts (KKR) used the criteria of recession resistance and 
a stable growth pattern when identifying potential buyout 
targets. Thomas H. Lee, president of Thomas H. Lee Co. and 
chairman and individual general partner of ML-Lee 
Acquisition Fund, testified before the Senate as a public 
witness in January 1989. He indicated that the amount paid 
for a "recession-proof" company would be substantially more 
than for a company in a highly cyclical business. Lee felt 
that most deals were carefully analyzed in this regard, 
resulting in reasonable decisions. 
14 
In contrast, Dr. Lawrence H. Summers of Harvard 
University, testified before the same committee that 
although LBOs are generally beneficial there would probably 
be some bankruptcies due to excessive LBO debt during the 
next recession. Dr. Alan J. Auerbach of the University of 
Pennsylvania testified that he feared the steady growth in 
the economy since the recession of 1981-1982 had caused 
people to "have shorter memories about what happens to 
corporate debt during recessions". In response to those 
citing Japan's very high debt-to-equity ratios throughout 
this period, Auerbach reminded the committee that Japan's 
research and development expenditures were much higher than 
those of u.s. firms. The Japanese were apparently using 
much of the debt to enhance future prospects, whereas U.S. 
firms were not. 
Government Regulation Possibilities 
This conflict has led to consideration of government 
regulation of LBOs, including possible constraints on 
prices paid for bought-out firms. To the extent that the 
consequences of wide-scale default'could be devastating to 
the u.s. economy, the federal government could justify 
intervening in LBO transactions. The cost of intervention 
would presumably be a reduction in economic efficiency, 
specifically a less efficient allocation of capital. 
Alan Greenspan has found it disturbing that the u.s. tax 
structure subsidizes corporate leveraging to such a high 
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degree. The Federal Reserve is concerned about the 
increasing share of restructuring loans made by banks. 
Greenspan warns, however, that the solution should not be 
sought through tax code changes or regulatory reform for 
financial institutions. In his opinion, these types of 
changes tend to be farther-reaching than the immediate 
problems which they are meant to solve. One probable 
effect of further regulation would be to give foreign 
acquirers an "artificial edge" to the extent that they 
could avoid the restrictions. Changes like those mentioned 
tend to merely extend the regulation-innovation cycle. 
Each time regulations are changed innovations take place 
which lead to circumvention of the new regulations. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Given the complexity of evaluating the impact of 
changes in regulation and the differences of opinion about 
the desirability of LBOs, it is of interest to focus on a 
few of the perceived issues. Two factors that are likely 
to determine how well a firm will be able to perform after 
a buyout are its cyclicality and the level of competition 
within the firm's industry. 
The first objective of this study is to determine if 
the LBOs that occurred in the u.s. during the study period 
from 1980 through 1990 reflected the cyclicality of the 
firms. A firm with substantial interest obligations needs 
to maintain its cash flows in all possible states of the 
16 
economy. If it is able to do so, concerns about the 
banking system, insurance companies, pension funds, and the 
economy in general being devastated by an economic downturn 
may be ameliorated. It is anticipated that cyclicality 
will be a factor in determining both the premium paid in a 
buyout and the reaction of the bought-out firm's stock 
price upo~ announcement of the buyout proposal. 
A second objective of this study is to examine the 
LBOs in the sample with respect to the level of competition 
that the target firm faces. The degree of competition 
within a firm's industry is a proxy for the relative amount 
of economic rents earned by the firm. The lower the 
competition, in general, the higher the rents and the 
better able the firm is to survive. Thus, industry 
concentration of the acquired firm should also have an 
influence on premium paid and stock price reaction. 
If the prices paid for bought-out firms and the 
resulting debt loads reflect payment obligations that are 
likely to b~ met in recessionary as well as expansionary 
and stable periods, then cyclicality and industry 
concentration are being considered, at least implicitly, 
when the LBO prices are determined. The firm's cash flows 
must be strong enough throughout economic cycles to service 
the debt acquired during the LBO. If firms' cash flows are 
likely to decrease substantially during a recession, then 
there is a greater likelihood of bankruptcy if a recession 
occurs. As noted previously, this is a cause for concern 
not only for individual firms, but for the economy as a 
whole because of the potential multiplier effects. 
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Other researchers have examined several other 
variables with respect to LBO premiums. These include 
ownership concentration (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 
1984b; Grammatikos and Swary, 1986); whether the buyout was 
management-led or third-party-led (Amihud, 1989; DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984b; Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer, 
1988; Kieschnick, 1988; Travlos and Cornett, 1990; 
Grammatikos and Swary, 1986); whether the firms had high or 
low effective tax liabilities (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989); 
whether there were competing offers for the bought-out firm 
(Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer, 1988; Lowenstein, 1985); 
the price-to-earnings ratio for the firm relative to that 
of the firm's industry (Travlos and Cornett, 1990); the 
presence or absence of managerial disputes (Travlos and 
Cornett, 1990); firm risk as measured by the standard 
deviation of returns on the firm's stock (Grammatikos and 
Swary, 1986), and the firm's level of undistributed cash 
flow (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). 
A third objective of this study is to combine the 
variables examined by these researchers, together with the 
cyqlicality and industry concentration variables proposed 
in this study, and to determine the relative importance of 
their influence on the movement. of stock prices on 
announcement of an intended buyout and on the amount of the 
premium paid for a bought-out firm. Amihud (1989), in 
particular, has recognized the need for this kind of 
synthesis of previous LBO studies. 
If LBO premiums and debt levels leave a cushion of 
safety for times of economic difficulty then the 
cyclicality of the firm and the industry concentration 
ratio should be significant even in the presence of the 
other explanatory variables. This study combines the 
previously examined variables with the two hypothesized 





Two types of studies have been done with respect to 
the impact of financial and managerial variables on LBO 
firms. The first type of study concerns the reaction of a 
firm's stock price to the announcement of an intended 
leveraged buyout. The empirical results of these studies 
are discussed in the first section below. The second type 
of study pertains to the size of the premium, or the amount 
above the firm's market value before the buyout was 
proposed, that is paid for the firm upon completion of the 
buyout process. The empirical results of these studies are 
discussed in the second section below. 
Studies concerning the two new variables examined by 
this research are reviewed next. The third section below 
concerns the impact of cyclicality on firms' operations. 
The fourth section relates to the level of concentration 
within an industry and its impact upon firms. 
The fifth section contains a discussion of the 
features of the 1986 Tax Reform Act that are relevant to a 
buyout situation. The sixth section reviews least squares 
regression techniques. Finally, the last section discusses 
event study methodology. 
19 
Stock Price Reactions at the 
Announcement of a Buyout 
20 
Positive abnormal returns to stockholders of the 
target firm at the announcements of proposed LBOs have been 
measured by several researchers (Amihud, 1989; DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984b; Grammatikos and Swary, 1986; 
Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Marais, Schipper, and Smith, 1987; 
Torabzadeh and Bertin, 1987; Travlos and Cornett, 1990). 
They ranged from the 13.00 percent found by Marais, 
Schipper, and Smith (1987) using an event period from -1 to 
0 days to 28.05 percent in the DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice 
(1984b) study, with an event period of -10 to +10 days. 
Maupin (1987) developed a multiple discriminant 
function to identify firms that would be potential 
management buyout targets. Variables such as concentration 
of ownership, the firm's (cash flow/net worth) ratio, the 
(price/earnings) ratio, the (cash flow/total debt) ratio, 
the (price/book value) ratio, the (book value of 
depreciable assets/original depreciable asset cost) ratio, 
and the dividend yield were used for classification of 
these firms. Some of these variables have been tested in 
relation to stock price movements and premiums offered 
during leveraged buyouts. 
Several researchers have addressed the question of 
what factors might account for differences in stock price 
reactions to proposed buyout announcements. A low 
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price/earnings (P/E) ratio relative to industry standards 
is associated with greater price increases (Travlos & 
Cornett, 1990). That is, the market appraises the increase 
in firm value as larger for those firms with lower P/E 
ratios relative to their industries. The perception seema 
to be that the firm with a low relative P/E ratio is 
underpriced prior to the b,uyout proposal announcement, and 
that the buyout will rectify the situation. 
Travlos and Cornett (1990) found a negative 
relationship between the degree of a stock's price increase 
and the presence of managerial disputes. If managerial 
dissention was publicized during the buyout process, the 
increase in stock price was not as great as if there was 
general agreement among managers. This may reflect the 
public's perception of the likelihood of the bid's success, 
with that likelihood increasing as there is more agreement 
among managers. 
Amihud (1989) presents a model of firm value for a 
' 
buyout situation. His model regards the price of a firm 
that has been acknowledged to be a buyout candidate as a 
function of the value of the firm going on as is, the 
expected final offer price, and the probability of the 
bid's success. Amihud depicts the relationship as 
where Price is the value of the stock at any 
time before the buyout date 
vf is the expected final offer price 
p is the probability of the bid's success s 
v is the price of the firm going on as is 
g 
pf is the probability of the bid's failure 
The expected final offer price is assumed to be 
greater than the price of the firm continuing as is. This 
is due to evidence from prev_iotis buyouts regarding 
shareholders' gains. The probability of success is 
assessed by the market based on the results of past 
situations that are comparable. The impact of managerial 
disputes on stock price is one example of a factor that 
would be likely to affect the probability of a bid's 
success. Another example would be the market's assessment 
of the long-term viability of the firm if the buyout bid 
succeeds. 
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The firm's risk, as measured by the standard deviation 
of its stock returns, was determined to be inversely 
related to stock price ~ncreases at the buyout proposal 
announcement, especially in the case of nonmanagement bids 
(Grammatikos and Swary, 1986). Lower-risk firms' stock 
prices increased 4.69 percent more net-of-market than 
higher risk firms' prices. Low-risk firms may more easily 
increase leverage and. enjoy the corresponding tax shields 
(Amihud, 1989). The market rewarded lower risk firms with 
greater stock price increases than higher risk firms. 
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In cases where management owned over 50 percent of a 
firm's stock, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984b) found an 
average net-of-market stock price increase at announcement 
20 percent higher than for firms with management ownership 
of less than 50 percent. Travlos and Cornett (1990) found 
ownership concentration to be insignificant as an 
explanatory factor of cumulative abnormal returns at 
announcement of a buyout offer. Thus the findings on this 
variable are inconclusive. 
The relationship between management ownership of a 
firm and the degree of stock price increase at announcement 
may be influenced by several factors. Amihud's (1989) 
model of firm value shows one of the elements involved. 
The greater a firm's pre-buyout management ownership is, 
the more likely the buyout will be successful if it is led 
by management or by non-hostile third parties. Second, 
there is the possibility that management suppressed firm 
performance in the period before the buyout offer, and the 
price increase reflects "artificially high" gains that 
would occur if the firm were properly functioning 
(Kieschnick, 1989; Maupin et al., 1984). The buyout would 
then be the solution to an efficiency problem which had 
been compounded by asymmetric information. Third, 
management costs for initiating or allowing a friendly 
third-party buyout would be low relative to third-party 
costs for carrying out a hostile buyout. The cost savings 
may be shifted toward the shareholders in these cases. 
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Empirical results do not support the underperformance 
hypothesis. DeAngelo (1986) found no evidence that 
management understated reported earnings in the period 
before the buyout offer. Maupin et al. (1984) noted that 
firms involved in management-led buyouts had above-industry 
dividend yields, on average; and Amihud (1989) found no 
significant difference between firm performance during the 
prior period for buyouts led by management and those led by 
third parties. The results of Grammatikos and Swary, which 
are discussed below, indicate that there may be an 
interaction between the degree of management ownership and 
whether the buyout is management or third-party led. 
The existence of management buyouts is a question in 
itself. Why would this form of corporate reorganization 
arise when most of its benefits seem to be attainable 
through other, less complicated, types of activity? For 
example, the increase in firm leverage and the accompanying 
tax benefits could be emulated by public companies. So 
could an increase in managerial control through stock 
repurchases. The registration, listing, and other monetary 
costs pertaining to regulation of a public company are low 
relative to total corporate costs. Thus their elimination 
is not a likely factor in going private. 
Amihud (1989) proposes that the factors of fewer 
regulatory constraints and the ability to retain property 
rights on firm information are the chief motivations for 
management buyouts (MBOs). The costs of these are 
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difficult to measure and may be significant. When managers 
think they can run the firm more efficiently without 
regulators or stockholders monitoring their decisions, it 
makes sense for them to function as a private concern. 
LBOs in which members .of management are involved as 
leaders result in sign1ficantly higher stock price 
increases than LBOs carried.out by third parties (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984b; Grammatikos & Swary, 1986; 
Travlos & Cornett, 1990). Reasons for this might include a 
higher expectation that the LBO will be completed, the fact 
that greater premiums are offered to shareholders by 
management parties, and the assessment that the firm's 
managers are taking advantage of information that is not 
publicly available. In contrast, Amihud (1989) found no 
significant difference in the degree of stock price 
increase at the announcement of a buyout bid whether the 
bid was made by managementor by third parties. His sample 
consisted of only fifteen firms and was confined to include 
very large buyouts. · Therefore·, the results on this 
variable are not conclusive. 
Grammatikos and Swary (1986) found that if the buyout 
was proposed by a third-party, the increase in stock price 
at announcement was positively related to the percent of 
the firm's stock owned by management. That is, the price 
increases were higher for high manage~ent ownership than 
for low management ownership. However, if the buyout was 
proposed by management, the increase in stock price was 
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negatively related to the percent of management ownership. 
The stocks of firms for which MBOs were proposed had 
greater price increases for lower management ownership 
percentages. There was an average positive increase in 
stock price of 3.15 percent for buyout bids of firms with 
high management ownership when the buyouts were initiated 
by parties other than ma~agement. For low management 
ownership and buyouts led by management groups, the average 
increase in stock price wa~ 4.69 percent. It is possible 
that higher premiums are offered in those cases where the 
market perceives a higher probability of the LBO failing. 
This would include situations. of nonmanagement bids for 
firms with high management ownership and management bids 
for firms with low management ownership (Amihud, 1989). 
There seems to be an important interaction between 
ownership concentration and who leads or proposes the 
buyout. There have been conflicting results in other 
studies when these two variables are considered 
individually; and the Grammatikos and Swary findings 
indicate different outcomes for the subgroups of management 
led and third-party led buyouts. Therefore, this study 
will include both variables individually as well as an 
interaction term to capture the possible relationship 
between them. The investigation of this joint effect was 
recommended by Amihud (1989). 
Factors that had no significant effect on firms' stock 
prices at the time of an LBO announcement include the 
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transaction size (Travlos and Cornett, 1990), the extent of 
the increase in debt after the buyout (Travlos and Cornett, 
1990), and whether the buyout plan was contested by 
minority stockholders (Travlos and Cornett, 1990). The 
same authors also examined the impact of assorted firm debt 
ratios and the relative annual listing costs, but found no 
significant 'relationship between· th,ese and the degree of 
stock price movement at the announcement of a buyout bid. 
Tab~e 1 gives a summary of the results relating to the 
variables tested for their influence on firms' stock prices 
at the announcement of an intended buyout. 
Premiums Offer'ed ,for Firms Involved 
in Leveraged Buyouts 
For a sample of 15 very large buyouts, Amihud (1989) 
found a premium of 31.1 percent (29.0 percent net-of-
market) on announcement of an LBO attempt and a premium of 
42.9 percent (26.0 percent net of market) at the final 
offer. The premiums were measured relative to stock prices 
20 days prior to the announcement of the buyout offer. The 
initial premiums offered for larger firms were lower than 
those for firms of all sizes combined. There was a 19.6 
percent increase in stock prices for Amihud's sample. This 
is similar to results from other studies which included 
firms of all sizes. Several studies have sought to 
identify factors. that may be related to these premiums. 
TABLE 1 
VARIABLES THAT HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR AN EFFECT 
ON STOCK PRICES AT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A 
PROPOSED LEVERAGED BUYOUT 
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Jensen's (1986) free cash flows hypothesis, which was 
discussed above, links high free cash flows to firms' 
agency cost inefficiencies which may be reduced through a 
reorganization. Lehn and Poulsen (1987) measured premiums 
relative to firms' stock prices 20 days before the buyout 
bid announcements. They found higher offered premiums for 
firms with higher undistributed cash flows relative to 
their total market equity, which is consistent with 
Jensen's proposition. 
Firms which have higher effective tax liabilities 
relative to equity would benefit from a reduction of these 
tax liabilities as the result of a management buyout. Lehn 
and Poulsen's (1987) results of higher offered premiums 
when tax liabilities were higher are consistent with this 
reasoning, since there would be a greater potential for tax 
savings for firms with higher tax liabilities. 
Lowenstein (1985) discovered higher premiums in 
situations where firms received three or more competing 
bids. The premiums were measured relative to stock price 
30 days before the buyout offer. Amihud (1989) found 
similar results using the criterion of one or more 
competing offers. Significantly lower premiums were 
offered for firms which later drew competing offers 
relative to premiums for firms which received a single 
buyout bid (Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer, 1988). They 
measured premiums relative to stock price 40 days before 
announcement. This contradicts the findings of the other 
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two studies above (Amihud, 1989 and Lowenstein, 1985). But 
after adjusting for several other factors, Easterwood, 
Hseih, and Singer found no difference in the results for 
firms which had competing offers and those which had a 
single bid. Thus the evidence concerning the relationship 
between premium size and the existence of competing bids is 
inconclusive. 
With regard to ownership structure of the firm and 
premiums offered to outside stockholders, there have been 
conflicting empirical results. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Rice (1984b) found an insignificant difference between 
average premiums for over-50 percent and under-50 percent 
management-owned firms although, as previously stated, they 
found a significant increase in stock prices at 
announcement of a buyout proposal. They measured premiums 
based on stock prices 40 days before the buyout offer 
announcement. The Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer (1988) 
results indicate significantly lower premiums offered for 
the stock of firms with higher, ownership concentration. 
This may reflect the anticipation of reduced agency costs 
as a motive for buyouts. Firms with high management 
ownership would be apt to have lower agency costs before a 
buyout. Thus their premiums would be lower because the 
reduction in agency costs for these firms would not be as 
great as for firms with low management ownership. 
There was an insignificant difference between premiums 
offered for management-led vs. third-party-led buyouts in 
31 
the Amihud (1989), the DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice 
(1984b), the Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer (1988), and the 
Kieschnick (1988) studies. It does not appear that firms' 
shareholders are taken advantage of, in terms of the 
premium offered to shareholders, when management advances a 
buyout bid relative to when third parties advance the bid. 
Note that the insignificant difference in premiums between 
the management-led buyouts and the third party-led buyouts 
is a different result than the significantly higher 
increase in the stock price for management-led buyouts. 
The most reasonable explanation for this would be the 
higher expectation of success for those buyouts led by 
management. 
A summary of these results is given in Table 2. 
Cyclicality 
some other studies have addressed the question of the 
potential economic stability of bought-out firms by looking 
at the resulting debt ratios, such as the debt-equity ratio 
and the interest coverage ratio (Faust, 1990; Travlos and 
Cornett, 1990). Debt ratios which measure equity based on 
book values are admittedly measures of a firm's past 
capacity. Although debt ratios which measure equity based 
on market values make allowance for expectations about a 
firm's future profitability, they may not be the most 
fitting elements to consider. If expectations are not 
TABLE 2 
VARIABLES THAT HAVE BEEN TESTED FOR AN EFFECT ON 
PREMIUMS OFFERED IN-LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
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borne out, a firm with heavy debt liabilities may find 
itself insolvent. 
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Evidence from these studies indicates that increased 
corporate debt increases firms' bankruptcy risk and that 
the probable increase in bankruptcies will worsen future 
recessions. The use of high-risk debt instruments such as 
junk bonds has been at the center of the debate over the 
desirability of leveraged buyouts. The main concern is the 
ability of bought-out firms to service the debt in a 
recessionary economy. 
Simulation studies offer some evidence about the 
effects of debt burdens during recessions. Bernanke and 
Campbell (1988) examined a sample of 643 large firms with 
varying debt loads under conditions resembling the severe 
recessions of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982. Their results 
indicated problems for about 10 percent of the firms which 
would necessitate additional borrowing and/or rescheduling 
of payments to avoid insolvency. 
Although adverse effects are indicated for a 
relatively small percentage of firms, the overall economic 
impact is potentially large. For each firm experiencing 
problems several other firms are likely to be affected. 
The troubled firm's suppliers, for example, might 
experience reduced demand for their materials. These 
suppliers would presumably react by reducing their own 
stocks of inventory, affecting additional firms. The 
economy is prone to such "ripple effects" that can 
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translate initially small problems into major concerns. 
Therefore the ability of bought-out firms to operate 
successfully in various economic cycles needs to be 
considered. The present study entails an evaluation of 
whether this factor is appraised at the time of the buyout. 
Warshawsky (1990) extended Bernanke and Campbell's 
work to consider the rise in debt burdens in 1987 and 1988 
and found an even greater percentage of firms would be 
distressed during a recession. As Faust (1990) indicates, 
the simulations do not allow for firms' reactions to the 
dilemma and do not reflect past and possible future changes 
in the financial environment that may be relevant. 
Previous studies have shown an empirical relationship 
between stock prices, and thus firm value, and the business 
cycle (Moore, 1983; Zarnowitz, 1990). Seth (1990) uses the 
regression coefficient of the percentage change in gross 
national product (GNP) when the ratio of firm earnings to 
firm assets is regressed on GNP to represent a "coefficient 
of cyclicality". The purpose of Seth's research is to 
assess the impact of increased leverage on firms' interest 
burdens in alternative economic states. A similar measure 
will be used in this study to determine whether cyclicality 
is an important factor with regard to buyout premiums and 
stock price reactions. 
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Industry Concentration 
Another factor that is relevant in determining a 
firm's capacity to operate under varying economic 
conditions is how much competition exists for the 
industry(ies) in which the firm operates. If a firm 
operates in a relatively noncompetitive environment then it 
should be able to weather a difficult period more easily 
than otherwise. As the level of competition rises, 
managing a firm with a heavy debt load will become more 
difficult. 
In a relatively concentrated market, there are fewer 
firms conducting business, or there is a small number of 
firms that dominate the industry. In this case, the 
dominant firms would command higher economic rents than in 
a less concentrated market. The higher economic rents 
would be more likely to sustain cash flows for the firm 
throughout business cycle fluctuations. 
Several studies within in the industrial organization 
field have established a positive empirical relationship 
between a concentrated market structure and cash flows 
(Shepherd, 1990; Ravenscraft and Schere~, 1986; Shepherd, 
1972; Bain, 1951). Shepherd (1990) states that increased 
market power leads to increased control ,over prices and the 
firm's ability to command a higher profit margin on sales. 
Price discrimination is also a possibility. The full 
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effect of these depends on the elasticity of demand for the 
firm's products. 
Shepherd (1990, 1972) found significant positive 
empirical relationships between firms' market shares and 
industry concentration relative to firms' profit rates. 
Bain (1951) provided the basis for using concentration 
ratios to measure market power. 
The best known concentration ratio is the Herfindahl 
Index, calculated by adding together the squared market 
share percentages for all firms in an industry (Copeland 
and Weston, 1988). A lower Herfindahl Index indicates less 
market power and a higher Herfindahl Index indicates more 
market power. The index is sensitive to both market shares 
of the firms within an industry and to inequality in the 
distribution of the market shares. It is frequently used 
as a guide in administering u.s. Department of Justice 
anti-trust guidelines in merger cases. 
The higher a target firm's Herfindahl index, the less 
competitive the industry, and the higher the premium that 
may be offered for access to the firm's economic rents. 
This hypothesis is analogous to the theory that one 
motivation for mergers is an attempt to increase access to 
market power (Copeland and Weston, 1988). In addition, a 
firm which has high cash flows to begin with would be 
better able to sustain those cash flows during a recession. 
Firms with higher market concentration tend to have higher 
cash flows (Shepherd, 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1986; 
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Shepherd, 1972; Bain, 1951). This ability to sustain cash 
flows during a recession should be priced. Therefore, a 
significant positive relationship is expected between the 
Herfindahl index and the premium paid for a firm acquired 
through a leveraged buyout. 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act 
Some of the controversy surrounding leveraged buyouts 
has been due to the fact that there are tax consequences 
resulting from the transaction. The u.s. tax code has 
favored corporate debt financing by allowing the 
deductibility of interest payments. This reduces corporate 
tax liability and has caused some concern regarding the 
level of tax collection from the corporate sector of the 
economy. One view, offered by Lowenstein (1985), is that 
the profits arising from LBO's are "gifts from the IRS" due 
to the accompanying interest and depreciation deductions. 
Grundfest (1989) acknowledges that LBO's tend to 
reduce corporate tax liability for a period of years after 
the buyout occurs. However, he explains that it would be 
incorrect to conclude that this causes an overall loss of 
revenue for the u.s. Treasury. Several factors have 
offsetting influences. 
The original stockholders of a bought-out firm are 
likely to experience a premium which must be recognized as 
a gain, and this is taxable. Some LBO's result in a sale 
of some firm assets. Any gain due to a market value 
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greater than the assets' book value would be taxable. Of 
course, a loss due to a market value less than the assets' 
book value would provide a tax benefit. In cases where the 
company is resold after a period of time, a taxable gain 
would result. Finally, the interest paid to bondholders by 
the bought-out corporation is taxable for the recipients. 
Therefore the total effect of buyouts on tax 
collections is not clear. What has been clearly documented 
is that the corporate tax benefits from LBO's are 
positively correlated with the size of the premium paid to 
stockholders (Kaplan, 1989; Lehn and Poulsen, 1987). Most 
of the benefit is passed on to the original stockholders 
and is not retained by the new owners of the firm. Tax 
considerations are seen not as a driving force in LBO 
activity, but the tax savings are important (Kaplan, 1989; 
Lehn and Poulsen, 1987). 
Given the significance of the role of taxes in LBO's, 
it is important to examine the impact of major changes in 
the u.s. tax code. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 involved 
several of these. The implementation of this act in 1987 
affected both personal and corporate taxes (Martin, 1991; 
Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1990; Prentice-Hall,1986; Warren, 
Gorham, and Lamont, 1986). 
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 there were eleven 
different marginal tax brackets for individuals, ranging 
from 11% to SO%. After the Act there were just two 
marginal brackets, with a maximum rate of 28%. Since the 
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premiums paid to individuals in LBO's are taxed as personal 
income to the extent that they represent gains to the 
stockholders, individuals were affected by this change. It 
seems likely that shareholders would be more receptive to 
LBOs after the Tax Reform Act than before. This effect 
could emerge in the form of lower required premiums. 
Several changes were enacted that affected corporate 
taxation. Prior to the Tax Reform Act the maximum marginal 
corporate tax bracket was 46%. After the Tax Reform Act it 
was 39%, with a maximum average rate of 34%. The impact of 
this change would be a reduction in the income tax shelter 
from interest expense and other LBO expenses such as the 
use of loss carryforwards from the acquired firm. The 
result of this change would be to make LBOs less attractive 
to acquirers. 
Before the Tax Reform Act, the tax basis of the assets 
acquired in an LBO could be increased. Afterward, it could 
not. This removed one of the potential income shelters for 
the acquirers, making LBOs less attractive. 
Other changes included a decrease in the amount of tax 
liability in excess of $25,000 that could be reduced by 
business tax credits; the elimination of lower rates for 
capital gains income; a reduction in the deduction 
allowance for dividend income; and new restrictions on the 
handling of net operating losses when there is more than a 
50% change in the ownership of a loss corporation over a 
three year period (Martin, 1991; Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 
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1990; Prentice-Hall,1986; Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, 
1986). The potential gain from buyouts was decreased by 
all of these factors. Buyouts became less attractive 
following the enactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (Gordon 
and MacKie-Mason, 1990). 
The total impact of the Tax Reform Act changes on the 
attractiveness of target firms is difficult to assess 
accurately •. This may,be especially true ~or investors who 
have only public information available to them. A firm's 
managers would have an advantage in this regard, since they 
would have inside information on which to base their 
opinions. That is, the information needed to evaluate firm 
value properly after the 1986 Tax Reform Act would be more 
readily available to insiders such as management. 
Due to the potential for changes in relationships 
among the factors viewed as important in determining stock 
premiums paid and the movement of stock prices at the 
announcement of a buyout bid, the sample in this study is 
considered in three ways. First a full sample period is 
used to estimate the effects. Then two subsamples are 
considered. The first includes buyouts with announcement 
dates up to and including 1986. The second includes 
buyouts announced after 1986. 
Least Squares Regression 
As established by previous similar studies, a multiple 
regression methodology is appropriate for examining the 
relationships between each dependent variable (buyout 
premium and stock price reaction) and the independent 
variables being examined (Lowenstein, 1990; Travlos and 
Cornett, 1990; Amihud, 1989; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer, 1988; Kieschnick, 1988; 
Grammatikos and Swary, 1986; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 
1984b). The general form of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model may be stated as 
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + . . • + bnXn + e 
where Y is the dependent variable, the X1 's are the 
independent variables, and e is a residual term (Judge, 
Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl, and Lee, 1985; Johnston, 1984; 
Johnson and Wichern, 1982; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
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In the current study there are two dependent variables 
of interest: the premium paid for the bought-out firm's 
stock and the stock price reaction. Independent variables 
include the two previously unexplored factors (the 
correlation coefficient between the firm's cash flows and 
the level of GNP, and the firm's Herfindahl index) and the 
eight factors found by previous studies to have an effect 
on the dependent variables (listed in Tables 1 and 2 
above). 
The assumptions of the multivariate regression model 
are that the residual terms are identically and 
independently distributed, with mean zero and variance o 2 
The X's are assumed to be measured without error. Under 
these conditions, the OLS estimators b1 , b2 , ••• , bn are 
best linear unbiased estimators (Johnston, 1984). 
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Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data, 
heteroscedasticity is likely to occur because of 
differences in firm size, nature of business, etc. (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981)~ That is, a violation of the OLS 
assumption of equal variances for all residual terms is 
probable. To adjust for this, 'a generalized least squares 
(GLS) is used to estimate the models. 
Specifically, the Glesjer (1969) procedure is used to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. This entails generating 
residuals from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 
the absolute values of which are then regressed by an OLS 
procedure on the explanatory variables. The squared 
reciprocals of the predicted residuals from this regression 
are the weights tbat are used to transform the data for the 
final OLS regression. The GLS estimators b1 , b2 , ••• , bn 
are best linear unbiased estimators (Johnston, 1984). 
Event Study Methodology 
Brown and Warner (1985) have established procedures 
for measuring the extent of stock price reactions to events 
which affect them. They tested the mean adjusted returns 
model and the market adjusted returns model which are used 
in this study and found them to be robust in determining 
excess returns. 
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Both the mean adjusted returns model and the market 
adjusted returns model estimate the cumulative abnormal 
return as the sum of the firm's excess returns during the 
event period. The event period extends from five days 
before the buyout announcement to five days after the 
announcement. 
For the mean adjusted returns model, the excess return 
on security i for day t is measured as: 
where 
A1,t = R1,t - RBAR1 
A1,t is the excess return on security i for 
day t 
R. tis the return of firm i's stock on 
l., 
day t 
is the average return on firm i's 
stock over the 239-day period that 
begins 244 trading days before the 
announcement of the initial buyout 
bid and ends 6 trading days before 
that announcement. 
Day 0 is the date of the buyout bid announcement. For the 
market adjusted returns model of excess returns, the excess 
return on a security is measured relative to the return on 
the CRSP equally weighted market index for day t ( Rm,t) : 
where A1,t and R1,t are defined as stated above for the mean 
adjusted returns model. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
As stated in the introduction, one purpose of this 
study is to investigate whether the prices paid for LBOs 
and the emerging debt issues reflect the cyclicality and 
the competitive environment of the firms taken over. That 
is, it examines whether the market considers the likelihood 
of the firm remaining financially sound throughout 
expansionary and recessionary economic states. The prices 
paid are reflected in both the premium offered at the 
buyout date and the stock price reaction at the 
announcement of the buyout. A second purpose of this study 
is to extend previous studies by combining those factors 
which they demonstrated to be of importance with the two 
new factors - cyclicality and industry concentration. 
A multiple regression methodology is used. Three 
alternative models are estimated, based on the results of 
previous empirical studies and the two new variables 
introduced by this study. 
Measurement of Dependent Variables 
A firm's stock price reaction at the announcement of 
the buyout intention and the premium eventually paid upon 
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completion of the buyout are interrelated according to 
Amihud' s ( 1989) model. Amihud depicts the r,elationship as 
where 
Price = (Vf x P8 ) + (V9 x Pf) 
Price is the value of the stock at any 
time before the buyout date 
Vf is the expected final offer price 
P8 is the probability of the bid's success 
V9 is the price of the firm going on as is 
Pf is the probability of the bid's failure 
Because the premium eventually paid would be reflected in 
the expected final offer price, both premium at buyout and 
stock price reaction at announcement are examined as 
dependent variables. 
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In the first model the annualized premium paid over the 
firm's market value prior to announcement of the intention 
to pursue a buyout, as a percentage of that market value, is 
the dependent variable. The announcement date is the date 
on which the publication of the news appeared in the 
Investment Dealers' Digest. The premium is defined as: 
where MVB0 is the market value of the firm at the 
time of the buyout 
MV_30 is the market value of the firm 30 days 
prior to announcement of the buyout 
attempt 
This premium is then annualized to account for differing 
lengths of time between announcement of the LBO and its 
completion: 
where 
ANUPREM = PREMIUM x (365/NDAYS) 
NDAYS is the number of days from the buyout 
announcement to the buyout completion 
The second model uses a mean adjusted returns model 
(Brown and Warner, 1985) to estimate the excess returns 
dependent variable. The dependent variable for this model 
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is the cumulative abnormal return based on the mean adjusted 
returns model (CARMEAN). CARMEAN is the sum of the firm's 
excess returns during the event period from five days before 
the buyout announcement to five days after announcement. 
Following Brown and Warner's procedure, the excess 
return on security i for day t is measured as: 
where 
A1,t = R1,t - RBAR1. 
A1,t is the excess return on security i for 
day t 
R1,t is the return of firm i 's stock on 
day t 
is the average return on firm i's 
stock over the 239-day period that 
begins 244 trading days before the 
announcement of the initial buyout 
bid and ends 6 trading days before 
that announcement. 
Day 0 is the date of the buyout bid announcement in the 
Investment Dealers' Digest. 
The third model is based on a market adjusted returns 
model of excess returns (Brown and Warner, 1985). Here the 
excess return on a security is measured relative to the 
return on the CRSP equally weighted market index for day t 
A = R - R i,t i,t m,t 
where A1,t and R1,t are defined as before. The dependent 
variable for this model is the cumulative abnormal return 
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based on the market adjusted returns model (CARMKT). CARMKT 
is the sum of the firm's excess returns during the event 
period from five days before the buyout announcement to five 
days after announcement. 
Independent Variables 
As stated above, other studies have identified the 
several significant factors in relation to stock price 
reactions and premiums offered. The significant factors 
were ownership concentration (Easterwood, Hseih, and Singer, 
1988; Grammatikos and Swary, 1986; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Rice, 1984b), whether the buyout is management led or third 
party led (Travlos and Cornett, 1990; Grammatikos and Swary, 
1986; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984b), whether the firm 
had competing buyout offers (Lowenstein, 1990; Easterwood, 
Hseih, and Singer, 1988), the firm's relative P/E ratio 
(Travlos and Cornett, 1990), firm risk in terms of the 
standard deviation of returns on its stock (Grammatikos and 
Swary, 1986), the firm's undistributed free cash flow (Lehn 
and Poulsen, 1989), its effective tax liability (Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989), and the presence of managerial disputes 
during the buyout process (Travlos and Cornett, 1990). Each 
of these factors is included as an independent variable in 
the regression models in this study. 
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The cyclicality factor is introduced in this study by 
using a measure that relates the nature of a firm's reaction 
to business cycles in general (CORRL). This measure is 
similar to Seth's (1990) coefficient of cyclicality. CORRL 
is constructed by calculating the correlation coefficient 
between the firm's cash flows and the level of nominal gross 
national product (GNP) for the United States economy. 
Nominal GNP is used because cash flow data are also in 
nominal terms. A period of ten years before the 
announcement of the buyout bid is used, with cash flows and 
GNP measured on an annual basis. 
This correlation implicitly considers the cash flows of 
the industry(ies) in which a firm is operating and the 
proportion of resources devoted to each industry, since the 
firm's cash flows will be affected by these factors. The 
higher the correlation between a firm's cash flows and 
nominal GNP, the greater the expected increase in its cash 
flows during market upswings and the more its cash flows are 
expected to fall during market downswings. 
A significant negative relationship between this 
correlation and the LBO premium is expected. That is, the 
less cyclical the firm is (i.e., the lower the correlation 
between its historical cash flows and GNP), the higher the 
premium that would be paid because the firm's cash flows are 
relatively stable with respect to the occurrence of economic 
downturns. Likewise, the more cyclical the firm is, the 
higher this correlation will be, and th~ lower the premium 
that may be prudently paid. 
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The second factor introduced by this study is the 
degree of competition a firm faces. This is commonly 
measured by the Herfindahl index. Several studies, 
discussed above, have established empirical relationships 
between market structure and cash flows (Shepherd, 1990; 
Shepherd, 1972; Bain, 1951; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1986). 
Shepherd (1972) in particular finds that both risk, as 
measured by yearly profit variation, and market structure 
have important effects on firms' profit rates and cash 
flows. 
A significant positive relationship is expected between 
the Herfindahl index {HERF) and the premium paid. The 
higher a firm's Herfindahl index, the less competitive the 
industry, and the higher the premium that may be offered for 
access to the firm's economic rents. 
If the cyclicality of the firm is implicitly considered 
during the buyout process, then CORRL should be significant 
as an independent variable even in the presence of those 
variables which produced significant results in other 
studies. Likewise, HERF should be significant if the 
competitive environment of the firm is evaluated. 
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Regression Models 
As discussed above, a generalized least squares (GLS) 
procedure is used to regress each of the dependent variables 
on the independent variables. The Glesjer (1969) procedure 
is used to correct for heteroscedasticity due to the cross-
sectional nature of the data. First the regressions are run 
using only the two new variables CORRL and HERF. Next the 
full regressions are run with all variables from previous 
studies and the two new variables introduced by this study. 
The form of the regression equation for each full model 
is given below: 
MODEL ONE 
ANUPREM = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5*MGMTOWN + A~;*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 
A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 
MODEL TWO 
CARMEAN = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5*MGMTOWN + A/LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 
A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 
MODEL THREE 
CARMKT = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB + 
A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 
where 
ANUPREM = the annualized premium paid over the firm's 
market value prior to announcement of the 
initial buyout bid as a percentage of that 
market value 
CARMEAN = the cumulative abnormal returns measure 
calculated using a mean adjusted returns 
model 
CARMKT = the cumulative abnormal returns measure 
·calculated using a market adjusted returns 
model 
CORRL = the correlation coefficient between the 
firm's cash flows and the level of GNP for 
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a period of ten years before the announcement 
of the buyout bid 
HERF = the firm's Herfindahl index, calculated as 
HERF = [SUM(i = 1 ton)] S12 
where 
S1 is the market share, in terms of 
sales, of the ith largest firm in the 
industry 
n is the number of firms in the 
industry, as determined by the buyout 
firm's 3-digit major SIC code 
RELPE = the P/E ratio of the firm at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
buyout, divided by the average P/E ratio of 
the industry as defined by the firm's 3-digit 
major SIC code 
DISP = a dummy variable which indicates the presence 
or absence of publicized managerial disputes: 
DISP = 1 if disputes were publicized 
DISP = 0 if there were no publicized disputes 
MGMTOWN = the percentage of stock owned by management 
on the last proxy statement date prior to the 
buyout bid announcement 
LED = a dummy variable which indicates who led the 
buyout: 
LED = 1 if the buyout was led by a group 
which included management 
LED = 0 if the buyout was third-party led, 
with no management participation 
CFLOW = the firm's undistributed free cash flow as a 
percentage of equity for the year immediately 
preceding the leveraged buyout, defined as in 
the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study: 
CFLOW =(INC - TAX - INTEXP - PFDDIV -COMDIV)/ 
(EQUITY) 
where 
INC = operating income before depreciation 
(COMPUSTAT item #13) 
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TAX = total income taxes minus the change in 
deferred taxes from the previous year 
to the current year 
(COMPUSTAT item #16 minus the change in 
COMPUSTAT item #35) 
INTEXP = gross interest expense on short- and 
long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item #15) 
PFDDIV = total amount of preferred dividend 
requirement on cumulative preferred 
stock and dividends paid on 
noncumulative preferred stock 
(COMPUSTAT item #19) 
COMDIV = total dollar amount of dividends 
declared on common stock 
(COMPUSTAT item #21) 
EQUITY = the market value of common equity at 
the end of the firm's fiscal year 
immediately preceding the 
transaction 
TAXLIAB = the firm's effective tax liability as a 
percentage of equity for the year immediately 
preceding the leveraged buyout, defined as in 
the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study: TAXLIAB = 
TAX I EQUITY, where TAX and EQUITY are 
defined as above 
COMPBID = a dummy variable which indicates the presence 
or absence of competing offers for the firm: 
COMPBID = 1 if there was at least one 
competing offer for the firm during 
the buyout period 
COMPBID = 0 if there were no competing offers 
for the firm during the buyout 
period 
OWNLED = an interaction term to account for a possible 
relationship between the degree of management 
stock ownership and who leads the buyout: 
OWNLED = MGMTOWN x LED 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the expected results for each 
of the regressions. The expected results are based on the 
outcomes of previous studies and on the theoretical basis 
for each variable, as discussed above. 
Data Sources 
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A list of companies involved in going private 
transactions from 1980 through 1987 is given by Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989). They generated the sample by searching the 
Wall Street Journal Index corporate entries for 
announcements of going private transactions for each year in 
the study period. 
This study covers the period 1980 through 1990. The 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) firm list is supplemented with firms 
which went private during 1988,1989, and 1990. There are 82 
firms from the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study for which all 
required data were available. Another 33 firms from the 
1988 through 1990 period supplemented these, yielding a 
total of 115 firms for the current study. The LBO firms for 
1988, 1989, and 1990 were determined by searching the 
DISCLOSURE CD-ROM data base for firms which filed Form 13E-3 
with the SEC during the period. This filing is required 
when a buyout is proposed. Each of the buyouts was 
confirmed by checking the Investment Dealers' Digest (IDD) 
for details of the transaction. The IDD was accessed 
through the LEXIS/NEXIS on-line data base. 
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TABLE 3 
EXPECTED RESULTS FOR MODEL ONE 
MODEL ONE 
ANUPREM = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2 *HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP 
+ A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB 
+ A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 
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EXPECTED RESULTS FOR MODEL TWO 
MODEL TWO 
CARMEAN = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP 
+ A5*MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB 
+ A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 





















T&C, G&S, DD&R: 
positive 
A:insignificant 
L&P result for 
premium 










EXPECTED RESULTS FOR MODEL THREE 
MODEL THREE 
CARMKT = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP 
+ A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB 
+ A9 *COMPBID + A10 *OWNLED + e 
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Daily returns data for each stock during the buyout 
period were obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) tape containing daily data through 
December 1990. Each firm's major SIC code was also obtained 
from the CRSP tape. 
The Wall Street Journal Index, also accessed through 
LEXIS/NEXIS, was searched for information about each firm 
that concerned whether there were competing bids, managerial 
disputes, or managers involved in the buyout. 
Details for cash flows, sales, P/E ratios, and tax 
liabilities were obtained from each relevant year's Standard 
and Poor's COMPUSTAT tape. Industry sales and industry P/E 
ratios were also constructed from information contained on 
the COMPUSTAT tapes, by aggregating firms according to 3-
digit SIC codes. That is, all firms with the same 3-digit 
SIC codes were identified and their sales figures were added 
to derive the value of sales for the industry. An industry 
P/E ratio was calculated by taking a weighted average of the 
P/E ratios of all firms with a given 3-digit SIC code, with 
weights equal to the proportion of industry sales that each 
firm generates. The firm and industry sales data are also 
used to calculate the Herfindahl Index as previously 
defined. 
For some firms, cash flow data and tax information were 
not available on COMPUSTAT. In this case the firms' annual 
reports from the DISCLOSURE microfiche collection were used 
to collect the data. The annual reports also provided the 
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date of each firm's fiscal year end, which is used to 
determine the balance sheet and income statement dates from 
which data are secured. Similarly, when a firm's P/E ratio 
was absent from the COMPUSTAT data base it was obtained from 
Standard and Poor's Security Owner's Stock Guide. 
Annual GNP for years 1969 through 1980 was found in the 
February 1992 issue of the,Survey of Current Business. 
Concentration of management ownership in the firm was 
collected from firms' proxy statements filed prior to the 
transaction announcement. The proxy statements were 
available through the SEC File microfiche collection. 
The market value of common equity at the end of the 
firm's fiscal year immediately preceding the transaction is 
from the Standard and Poor's Daily Stock Price Record. 
A very small number of firms in the sample (4) could be 
classified as having publicized managerial disputes during 
the buyout process. Therefore the dummy variable DISP was 
eliminated from the regressions due to a lack of a 
statistically reasonable number of dispute occurrences. 
The total number of firms for which all of the data 
were available was 105. Ten additional firms for which a 
small subset of the data were unavailable were used for 
reduced model regressions. 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 6 below provides information concerning the 
timing of announcements and completions of buyouts for the 
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TABLE 6 
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS: 
TIMING OF BUYOUTS 
NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH 
YEAR BUYOUT ANNOUNCEMENTS BUYOUT COMPLETIONS 
1980 3 0 
1981 4 3 
1982 9 9 
1983 12 7 
1984 14 21 
1985 14 10 
1986 18 20 
1987 22 12 
1988 9 16 
1989 8 11 
1990 2 6 
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sample firms. The pattern of the sample firms is typical of 
the overall pattern of buyout activity, which began in the 
early 1980's, peaked around the middle of the decade, then 
declined toward the end of the decade. 
Table 7 below presents summary statistics concerning 
the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values 
for the variables. NDAYS denotes the number of trading days 
from the first announcement of a buyout bid to completion of 
the buyout. All other variables are as defined in the 
regressions. 
The quickest buyout occurred 51 days after its 
announcement, and the most prolonged buyout took 533 days. 
The average length of time between announcement and 
completion was 155.3 days, with a standard deviation of 81.7 
days. The value of NDAYS was used to annualize the premium 
paid as described in the Methodology section of this paper. 
Annualized premiums paid for the common stock of bought 
out firms ranged from -70.4% to 430.4%, with an average 
premium of 106.6% and a standard deviation of 84.4%. 
Cumulative abnormal returns as measured by CARMEAN and 
CARMKT were as low as -29.2% and as high as 68.1%, with a 
standard deviation of about 16%~ 
All of the dependent variables demonstrate a wide 
variety of values within their possible ranges. CORRL, for 
example, ranges from -0.98, which would indicate a counter-
cyclical firm, to 0.98, which represents a firm whose cash 

















SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT 
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Mean Standard Minimum 
Value Deviation Value 
155.30 81.69 ·51.00 
1.066 0.844 -0.704 
0.182 0.166 -0.292 
0.185 0.158 -0.184 
0.308 0.541 -0.981 
0.219 0.126 0.037 
0.171 0.393 -0.921 
18.30 18.33 0.60 
28.64 59.74 -76.12 
0.091 0.272 -0.420 
0.487 0.502 0 
0.336 0.475 0 


















States economy as measured by GNP. HERF ranges from 0.037, 
which indicates a relatively competitive market situation, 
to 0.6, representing a much less competitive market. RELPE 
takes on values from -0.92 to 2.84. Some of the firms or 
the industries had negative P/E ratios due to net losses. 
MGMTOWN varies from a very low 0.6% of total common shares 
outstanding to 70.96% of the shares. 
CFLOW and TAXLIAB are expressed as percentages of the 
firm's equity, and range from very low negative percentages 
to very high positive percentages. CFLOW is negative for 
some firms because by definition it involves relationships 
between such things as operating income, the change in 
deferred taxes, and interest expense. TAXLIAB may also be 
negative because its calculation involves the change in 
deferred taxes from one year to another. 
The mean of the LED variable indicates that the sample 
is about evenly split between firms whose buyouts were led 
by a group which included management (48.7%) and those led 
by a third-party group (51.3%). The average value of 
COMPBID is 33.6%, which means that this percent of firms in 
the sample experienced at least one other competing bid 
during the buyout period. A majority of the sample firms 
(66.4%) did not have competing bids. 
Table 8 below shows the distribution of the sample 
firms according to industry, grouped by 2-digit SIC codes. 
Although 3-digit SIC codes are used for determining firms' 



















































OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION 1 
HEAVY CONSTRUCTION, NOT BLDG. 1 
CONSTRUCTION, SPECIAL TRADE 1 
FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 7 
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS 5 
APPAREL AND OTHER FINISHED PRODUCTS 5 
LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS, EX. FURN. 2 
FURNITURE AND FIXTURES - . 2 
PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 8 
PRINTING, PUBLISHING, AND ALLIED 3 
CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 1 
RUBBER AND MISC. PLASTICS PRODUCTS 3 
STONE, CLAY, GLASS, CONCRETE PRODUCTS 4 
PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES 3 
FABRICATED METAL, EX. MACH., TRANS EQ. 5 
IND. AND COMM. MACHINERY, COMPUTER EQ. 6 
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT COMPUTER 7 
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 3 
MEAS. INSTR., PHOTO. GOODS, WATCHES 3 
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1 
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 1 
MOTOR FREIGHT TRANS., WAREHOUSE 1 
COMMUNICATIONS 5 
DURABLE GOODS - WHOLESALE 1 
NONDURABLE GOODS - WHOLESALE 2 
BLDG MATL, HARDWARE, GARDEN - RETAIL 3 
GENERAL MERCHANDISE STORES 1 
FOOD STORES 2 
APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES 4 
HOME FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT STORE 1 
EATING AND DRINKING PLACES 6 
MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL 6 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 2 
REAL ESTATE 1 
HOLDING, OTHER INVEST. OFFICES 2 
PERSONAL SERVICES 1 
BUSINESS SERVICES 2 
MOTION PICTURES 1 
HEALTH SERVICES 1 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 1 
SERVICES, NEC. 1 
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grouping displayed gives an overall view of the general 
nature of the firms' industries. A total of 41 different 
industries are represented in the sample, which provides 
good diversity. The industry experiencing the most buyouts 
was paper and allied products (SIC· 2600), with 8 sample 
firms. This is followed by foo~ and kindred products (SIC 
2000) and electric equipment, except computer (SIC 3600), 
which each have 7 bought-out firms. There are many 
industries for which 1 or 2 firms are represented in the 
sample. The sample is representative of the overall pattern 
of LBO's during the decade with respect to industries. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Regression Results for the Buyout 
Premium Models 
The results for Model 1, which has the annualized 
premium paid for bought-out firms as a dependent variable, 
are presented in Tables 9 through 14. Tables 9 through 11 
present regressions which contain only the two new variables 
introduced by this study as independent variables. Tables 
12 through 14 contain these two variables as well as the 
significant variables from other studies for which data were 
available. 
The full sample regression shown in Table 9 includes 
firms which experienced buyouts both before and after the 
1986 Tax Reform Act. The results for this regression show a 
significant negative relationship between market 
concentration (HERF) and the annualized premium (ANUPREM) 
paid for the firms. This is the opposite of the 
hypothesized positive relationship. The more concentrated 
the market in which the firm operates, the lower the premium 
that is paid. The cyclicality of the firm's cash flows 
(CORRL) is not a significant variable. 
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TABLE 9 
REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON TWO INDEPENDENT 











F Value 3.898** 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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Regression results for firms for which the buyout was 
announced before 1986 are shown in Table 10. Neither CORRL 
nor HERF were significant during this time period, 
indicating that acquirers were not considering cash flow 
cyclicality or market concentration in determining the 
premiums paid during the 1980-1986 interval. 
After 1986, however, both CORRL and HERF were 
significant in determining the premiums paid. Table 11 
shows these results. The sign of each regression 
coefficient is the opposite of the hypothesized sign. The 
coefficient of CORRL is positive, indicating that the 
premium paid was higher for firms with greater cyclicality 
of cash flows relative to nominal GNP. The coefficient of 
HERF is negative, indicating that the premium paid was 
lower for firms operating in industries with greater market 
concentration. 
Table 12 shows the regression results for the full 
sample of firms, with dependent variable ANUPREM and all 
nine independent variables. In this regression, market 
concentration (HERF) and the percentage of management 
ownership (MGMTOWN) are significant variables. The sign of 
the HERF coefficient is the opposite of what was expected, 
and indicates an inverse relationship between the premium 
paid and market concentration. The sign of MGMTOWN's 
coefficient is negative. This is consistent with what was 
expected, and confirms the Easterwood, Hsieh, and Singer 
(1988) result. The more of the bought-out firm's stock 
TABLE 10 
REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WIT8 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 











F Value 0.547 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically-significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 11 
REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 











F Value 40.555 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 






REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: THE FULL SAMPLE 
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ANUPREM = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*l{ERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 1.200 
statistically significant at the 1% level 
statistically significant at the 5% level 
statistically significant at the 10% level 
management owned prior to the buyout announcement, the 
lower the premium that was paid. 
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The regression results for the Tax Group One subsample 
and all nine independent variables are in Table 13. The 
premium paid is significantly and negatively related to 
CORRL and to COMPBID. For firms whose buyouts were 
announced prior to 1986, the premiums paid increased as the 
cyclicality of their cash flows decreased. This is 
consistent with the hypothesized relationship. Premiums 
paid for firms which had one or more competing buyout bids 
were lower than for firms which did not have competing 
bids. This is the opposite of the expected result. 
The Tax Group Two subsample results in Table 14 
indicate significance for CORRL, HERF, and MGMTOWN. Firms 
with buyout announcement dates after 1986 had premiums that 
were positively related to cash flow cyclicality, 
negatively related to market concentration, and negatively 
related to percentage management ownership prior to the 
buyout announcement. The cyclicality and concentration 
relationships are the opposite of those hypothesized. The 
percent management ownership sign is consistent with the 
expected result, and confirms the Easterwood, Hsieh, and 
Singer (1988) result. 
TABLE 13 
REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 
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ANUPREM = A0 + A1 *CORRL + A2 *HERF + A3 *RELPE + A4 *DISP + 
~5*MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 1.209 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
TABLE 14 
REGRESSION OF ANUPREM ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 
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' ANUfREM = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 2.072 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
Regression Results for the Stock 
Price Reaction Models 
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Tables 15 and 16 contain the regression results for 
the full sample of firms, for the stock price reaction 
models based on the CORRL and HERF variables. The 
dependent var.i.able in Table 15 is CARMEAN, the cumulative 
abnormal returns measure calculated using a mean adjusted 
returns model. The dependent variable in Table 16 is 
CARMKT, the cumulative abnormal returns measure calculated 
using a market adjusted returns model. 
For the regression which used CARMEAN as the measure 
of stock price reaction neither CORRL nor HERF was 
significant. The CARMKT regression, however, shows 
significance for CORRL, which is positively related to the 
stock price reaction. That is, the greater the correlation 
between a firm's cash flows and nominal GNP, the greater 
its positive stock price reaction at the announcement of a 
buyout. This is the opposite of the relationship expected 
between these two variables. HERF was not significant in 
this regression. 
When the firms in Tax Group One (those which had 
buyout announcements before 1986) are considered 
separately, the results are similar for the CARMEAN 
regression. These results are presented in Table ·17 
below. Neither CORRL nor HERF proved to be significant in 
determining stock price reaction as measured by CARMEAN 
TABLE 15 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: THE FULL SAMPLE 











F Value 0.556 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 16 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: THE FULL SAMPLE 











F Value 1.499 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 17 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 











F Value 0.110 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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during this time period. 
Table 18 shows results for the Tax Group One firms 
based on the CARMKT measure. These results are similar to 
the full sample regression results in that HERF is 
insignificant. They are dissimilar in that CORRL is 
insignificant for this tax group, whereas it was 
significantly positive for the full sample of firms. 
For firms whose buyouts were announced after 1986, 
neither CORRL nor HERF played a significant role in 
determining stock price reaction. The results of these 
regressions are presented in Table 19 for dependent 
variable CARMEAN and Table 20 for dependent variable 
CARMKT. 
The results of the regression of the full sample of 
firms for all nine independent variables are presented in 
Table 21 for the CARMEAN measure of stock price reaction 
and in Table 22 for the CARMKT measure of stock price 
reaction. Only COMPBID is significant with respect to both 
dependent variables, and its coefficient is negative. This 
indicates that firms which had at least one competing bid 
during the buyout period experienced smaller stock price 
reactions when the buyout was first announced than firms 
for which no competing bids were received. None of the 
other independent variables are significant in either the 
CARMEAN regression or the CARMKT regression. 
When the firms are broken into subsamples, however, 
the results are different. Tables 23 and 24 show that the 
TABLE 18 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 











F Value 0.255 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 19 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 











F Value 0.965 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 20 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON TWO INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 











F Value 2.417* 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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TABLE 21 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: THE FULL SAMPLE 
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CARMEAN= A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3 *RELPE + A4 *DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 1.476 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
TABLE 22 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: THE FULL SAMPLE 
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CARMKT =, A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + -A4*DISP + 
A5*MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 1.696 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
TABLE 23 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 
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CARMEAN = A0 + . A1 *CORRL + A2 *HERF + A3 *RELPE + A4 *DISP + 
A5*MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CELOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 5.111*** 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
TABLE 24 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP ONE - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES BEFORE 1986 
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CARMKT = A0 + A1 *CORRL + A2 *HERF + A3 *RELPE + A4 *DISP + 
A5*MGMTOWN + A6*LED + A7*CFLOW + A8*TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 3.396 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
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results of the stock price reaction regressions for firms 
with buyout announcements occurring before 1986 are similar 
for the CARMEAN and CARMKT measures. During this period 
the firms' effective tax liabilities (TAXLIAB) and the 
presence or absence of competing ~ids (COMPBID) played a 
significant role with respect to stock price reactions at 
announcement. 
TAXLIAB is positively related to CARMEAN and CARMKT, 
indicating that firms with greater effective tax 
liabilities experienced greater increases in stock price at 
the announcement of a buyout bid than firms with lesser 
effective tax liabilities. This is consistent with the 
expected result. The TAXLIAB variable had not been 
examined previously with regard to stock price reaction. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1987) found a significant positive 
relationship between TAXLIAB and the buyout premium paid. 
Firms in Tax Group One which received competing bids 
during the buyout period had lower stock price reactions at 
the initial announcement of a buyout. This is the opposite 
result of what was expected. 
The stock price reactions for firms in Tax Group Two 
were significantly affected by the percentage of management 
ownership prior to the buyout announcement. Tables 25 and 
26 show that for both the CARMEAN and the CARMKT measures 
of stock price reaction, firms with higher management 
ownership experienced smaller stock price reactions than 
firms with lower management ownership. The negative 
TABLE 25 
REGRESSION OF CARMEAN ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 
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CARMEAN = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB + 
' ' 

























F Value 2.130* 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
TABLE 26 
REGRESSION OF CARMKT ON NINE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: TAX GROUP TWO - FIRMS WITH 
ANNOUNCEMENT DATES 1986 AND AFTER 
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CARMKT = A0 + A1*CORRL + A2*HERF + A3*RELPE + A4*DISP + 
A5 *MGMTOWN + A6 *LED + A7 *CFLOW + A8 *TAXLIAB + 

























F Value 33.511*** 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level 
regression coefficient on this variable is the opposite 
result of what was expected. 
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There is a difference between the CARMEAN and the 
CARMKT measures in regard to the significance of the other 
variables. For firms in Tax Group Two, only MGMTOWN is 
significant in its relationship to stock price change as 
measured by CARMEAN. For the same firms, HERF and TAXLIAB 
are significant in addition to MGMTOWN when the stock price 
reaction is measured by CARMKT. 
The regression coefficient for HERF in Table 26 is 
negative. This indicates that firms operating in 
industries which are more concentrated experienced smaller 
stock price reactions at announcement as measured by 
CARMKT. This is the opposite of the result that was 
expected. 
The positive regression coefficient for TAXLIAB in 
Table 26 indicates a direct relationship between effective 
tax liability and stock price reaction at the announcement 
of a buyout. That is, firms with higher effective tax 
liabilities experienced greater stock price reactions at 
the announcement of a buyout than firms will lower 
effective tax liabilities. This is consistent with the 
result that was expected. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objectives of this research are threefold. The 
first purpose of this study is to evaluate whether the LBOs 
that occurred during the study period reflected the 
cyclicality of the firms, as quantified by the correlation 
coefficient between the firm's cash flows and the gross 
national product of the United States economy. The second 
purpose is to examine the LBOs in the sample with respect 
to the level of competition that each firm faces as 
measured by the Herfindahl Index. 
The third purpose is to combine the variables examined 
by other researchers with the cyclicality and industry 
concentration variables that are unique to this study. The 
importance of these two variables is evaluated when they 
are integrated with the other variables, and their strength 
with regard to influence on buyout premiums and stock price 
reactions is measured. Amihud (1989), in particular, has 
recognized the need for this kind of synthesis of previous 
LBO studies. 
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Interpretation of Results: 
Premiums Paid 
A review of the premium regression results for the 
full sample and for tax groups 1 and 2 is displayed in 
Table 27 below. It appears that the tax group breakdown 
aided the determination of variable effects which were 
masked in the full sample regressions. A confounding of 
91 
variable effects is possible if art independent variable is 
negatively related to the dependent variable during one 
subperiod and positively related to the'dependent variable 
during another subperiod. In this case, combining firms 
from both subperiods for a ~ull sample regression may yield 
" . ' 
an insignificant regression-coefficient. The individual 
subsample effects are free to emerge in the subperiod 
regressions. 
Only the degree of market concentration (HERF) was 
significant in the premi~m regression for the full sample 
of firms. Firms with a higher Herfindahl index, which 
indicates greater market concentration, had lower buyout 
premiums. It was hypothesized that the opposite 
relationship would hold, based on the likelihood of an 
inverse relationship between market concentration and 
competitiveness within the industry. Firms operating in 
concentrated markets would presumably face less competition 
and have greater ability to maintain their market shares 




Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 2 
Tax Group 2 
Tax Group 2 
TABLE 27 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR THE 
FULL SAMPLE AND THE SUBSAMPLE 










ANUPREM CORRL negative 
ANUPREM COMPBID negative 
-------------------------------------------
ANUPREM CORRL positive 
ANUPREM HERF negative 
ANUPREM MGMTOWN negative 
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HERF did not prove to be significant for firms with 
buyout announcements before 1986. Firms with announcements 
during and after 1986 had the same significant negative 
relationship between market concentration and the buyout 
premium paid as the full sample had. This indicates that 
the competitive environment in which the firms were 
operating became more important to consider after the 1986 
Tax Reform Act was passed. 
It is likely that each firm's competitive position 
within its market was perceived with reasonable accuracy 
and priced by the market prior to the buyout bid. The HERF 
variable in the regressions measures the impact of market 
concentration on the value of the firm with specific regard 
to the buyout. One possible explanation for a negative 
coefficient for HERF would be the ease with which firms in 
less concentrated industries can be monitored, and their 
proper market value assessed before a buyout bid is 
announced. 
It is often the case that information not previously 
available about a firm which is a buyout target is revealed 
to the market during the buyout process. The amount of 
asymmetric information available to the market may depend 
on the market structure of the industry. This factor may 
have confounded the results of this study. 
Roll's hubris hypothesis (1986) may also apply to a 
buyout situation. If there is more limited information 
available about firms in one market structure versus 
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another, then investors could be overoptimistic about the 
potential rewards of a buyout in some cases relative to 
others. Premiums for these firms would therefore be higher 
than premiums for firms for, which more information 
concerning the true rewards, is.available. 
Another factor which may have some influence is 
whether or not the buyout leads to a merger which would 
increase market concentration within an industry. If the 
acquirer is a firm in the same industry as the bought-out 
firm an increase in overall market concentration will 
result from the merger. The firms in this study were 
analyzed with regard to access to market power without 
regard to the target and acquiring firms' industries. 
The measure of the cyclicality of a firm's cash flows 
relative to nominal u. s. GNP (CORRL) was significant in 
both of the premium subsample regressions. A negative 
relationship was hypothesized. This was the result for the 
tax group one firms, which had buyouts announced before 
1986. But the tax group two regression produced the 
opposite-result. 
It is possible that by the mid-1980's, when the 
country was well into an expansionary economic period, 
investors were more confident regarding the stability of 
cash flows. "Down-side" cyt:licality may not have been as 
big a concern as it was earlier in the decade when the 
country was recovering from the 1981-82 recession. The 
coefficients of CORRL in the subsample regressions may 
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reflect investors' myopic views based on recent experience, 
biasing their evaluation of the cyclicality of firms' cash 
flows. 
The regressions indicate a significant negative 
relationship between the presence of one or more competing 
bids (COMPBID) and the premiums paid for firms whose 
buyouts were announced before 1986. A positive 
relationship had been hypothesized~ based on the likelihood 
that competing acquirers would interact to bid up the final 
buyout price. 
The COMPBID variable was not significant for firms which 
had buyout announcements during or after 1986. 
Lowenstein (1985) found a significant positive 
relationship between the presence of competing bids and the 
size of the buyout premium. Easterwood, Hsieh, and Singer 
(1988) tested this variable and did not find significance. 
It may be that information regarding the firm's true 
value was unearthed to a greater degree when more than one 
bidder was involved. As more information became available 
investors would be less likely to be overoptimistic, 
resulting in lower premiums paid. This would be especially 
true before the Tax Reform Act changes took effect. 
As pointed out in the literature review above, several 
facets of the Tax Act had the potential to affect firms' 
buyout values. Some of the anticipated effects were likely 
to produce lower required premiums for bought-out firms. 
For example, there were lower maximum personal tax rates, 
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lower maximum corporate tax rates, restrictions on 
adjusting the tax basis of assets acquired, and changes in 
the handling of operating losses. Much of the information 
needed to evaluate the full impact of the tax code change 
on the value of a firm would be difficult to obtain. This 
might explain why COMPBID is not a significant factor after 
1986. 
The percentage of the firm's common stock owned by 
managers prior to buyout announcement (MGMTOWN) proved to 
be significant and negatively related to the premium paid 
for the firms in Tax Group Two. This is the opposite of 
the expected positive relationship. However, this result 
would be consistent with the notion that the information 
needed to assess firm value after the Tax Act was more 
readily available to insiders such as management. The more 
of an ownership interest managers had, the more information 
they had, and the less likely they were to be 
overoptimistic about firm value. This factor was not as 
important before the Tax Act, when the tax consequences of 
a buyout were more easily assessed by competing bidders. 
Easterwood, Hsieh, and Singer (1988) found a 
significant negative relationship between premium paid and 
the level of management ownership. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Rice (1984b) found inconclusive results for this variable 
with regard to premium, but found positive results for it 
with regard to stock price reaction. 
Interpretation of Results: 
Stock Price Reactions 
Table 28 below shows the results for the full sample 
and the subsample stock price reaction regressions. Two 
measures were used to evaluate stock price reactions. 
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These are the cumulative abnormal returns measure based on 
a mean adjusted returns model (CARMEAN), and the cumulative 
abnormal returns measure based on a market adjusted returns 
model (CARMKT). 
The only variable that shows significance for the full 
sample of firms is whether or not there was at least one 
competing bid for a firm (COMPBID). COMPBID has a 
significant negative relationship with both measures of 
cumulative abnormal returns. There was a smaller price 
reaction during the event period from five days before to 
five days after the buyout announcement for firms which 
received at least one competing bid during the buyout 
process. 
It is interesting to note that this factor is 
significantly related to the stock price reaction, when in 
fact the competing bid or bids may not have been received 
until after the end of the event period. Evidently, 
expectations regarding the likelihood of a competitive bid 





Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 2 
Full 
Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 1 
Tax Group 2 
Tax Group 2 
Tax Group 2 
TABLE 28 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES FOR THE 
FULL SAMPLE AND THE SUBSAMPLE 











CARMEAN COMPBID negative 
CARMEAN TAXLIAB positive 
------------------------------------------
CARMEAN MGMTOWN negative 
CARMKT COMPBID negative 
------------------------------------------
CARMKT COMPBID negative 
CARMKT TAXLIAB positive 
------------------------------------------
CARMKT HERF negative 
CARMKT MGMTOWN negative 
CARMKT TAXLIAB positive 
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As Amihud's (1989) model indicates, the price of a 
buyout target at any given time during the buyout process 
is a function of both the probability of a successful 
buyout and the anticipated final buyout price. Both of 
these factors will also influence the stock price reaction 
at the initial announcement of a buyout bid. As investors 
evaluate the likelihood of competing bid occurrences they 
are also likely to shift their expectations regarding the 
probability of success and the final price. The separate 
effects of these two factors on firm value are difficult to 
determine. This is an area for possible future 
exploration. 
COMPBID also emerges as a significant variable for the 
Tax Group One subsample regression, with the same negative 
relationship to CARMEAN and CARMKT as in the full sample 
regression. When Tax Group Two is considered, COMPBID is 
no longer significant for either measure of cumulative 
abnormal return. This result is similar to the one 
discussed above regarding the premium regressions. There 
appears to have been a shift away from the use of competing 
bid information or expectations to value the buyout firms. 
The other variable that is significant in determining 
stock price reactions for CARMEAN and CARMKT before 1986 is 
the firm's effective tax liability (TAXLIAB). The sign of 
the regression coefficient is positive, as was expected. 
The greater the firm's effective tax liability, the more 
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beneficial would be the deductibility of interest payments 
and losses incurred through a buyout. 
TAXLIAB is also significant for the CARMKT measure 
after 1986, but not for CARMEAN. The market 
adjustedmeasure of abnormal returns may be more sensitive 
to detecting the effect of TAXLIAB than the mean adjusted 
measure. The mean adjusted measure relies on past data 
from the firm itself, which may not be as likely to reflect 
the impact of the tax code changes as the overall market. 
Effective tax liability did not play a significant 
role in determining the premiums paid for buyout firms in 
this study. Lehn and Poulsen (1987), whose sample included 
buyouts which occurred between 1980 and 1987, found a 
significant positive relationship between effective tax 
liability and the premium paid. 
Both the CARMEAN and the CARMKT dependent variables 
were significantly negatively related to MGMTOWN for buyout 
announcements occurring after the Tax Reform Act. The sign 
is the opposite of what was expected. The greater the 
percentage of stock owned by management prior to the buyout 
bid announcement, the lower was the stock price reaction at 
announcement. 
This is similar to the results of this study for 
buyout premiums in regard to MGMTOWN. If management 
already owns a significant proportion of the stock, it is 
likely that the firm is more accurately valued prior to the 
buyout bid. Under these circumstances, the announcement of 
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a buyout would not be as likely to trigger overoptimism on 
the part of the investors. The value of managerial 
knowledge about true firm value is especially important 
after the tax changes, as discussed above. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984b) found a 
significant positive relationship between the percentage of 
management ownership and the stock price reaction at the 
announcement of buyout bids. Their sample consisted of 
firms which experienced announcements prior to the change 
in the tax code. In contrast, in the"current study, 
MGMTOWN was significant after the tax changes, but not 
before. 
Market concentration as measured by HERF was 
significant only during the after-1986 period in 
relationship to cumulative abnormal returns, and only when 
the abnormal returns were measured by CARMKT. It may be the 
case, as it was with TAXLIAB, that the market adjusted 
measure is more sensitive to the influence of market 
concentration than the firm's mean adjusted measure. 
The sign of the regression coefficient is negative, 
which is the opposite of the sign that was expected. Firms 
in more concentrated industries had lower stock price 
reactions at announcement of a buyout bid. The sign is 
consistent with the results which were obtained for the 
premium regression. Market concentration also had a 
significant negative effect on the premium paid for firms 
in the Tax Group Two subsample. 
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Market concentration and the competitive environment 
in which firms operate appear to have become more important 
after the tax changes. The same reasons as discussed above 
concerning premiums would also apply here. The accuracy of 
firm valuation prior to the buyout bid, Roll's (1986) 
hubris hypothesis, differences in the ability to monitor 
firms in markets which have different degrees of 
concentration, and the possibility of the buyout itself 
influencing market concentration are all possible 
explanations for the significant negative relationship. 
Future Research 
several issues remain to be examined. One of the most 
prominent regression results is the significance of the 
intercept terms. It is likely that one or more variables 
that are important in relation to buyout premiums is being 
omitted from the regression. Research on some of the 
factors discussed below may prove to be fruitful in 
identifying these factors. 
One possibility is that an alternative measure of 
cyclicality would be better in identifying the recession-
resistance of firms. If firms are valuing stability rather 
than counter-cyclicality, then the absolute value of CORRL 
would be the preferred measure. However, preliminary 
results do not support this. In addition, Seth (1990) 
described several alternative measures of cyclicality which 
could be tested in relation to buyouts. 
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A dummy variable or a subsample breakdown in reference 
to the nature of acquiring firms' businesses might also 
provide insight. It may be that there are different 
effects on premiums and stock prices in situations 
depending on whether or not the acquiring firm's nature of 
business is closely related to the target firm's business. 
A similar breakdown which measures the arrival pattern 
of competing bids may also be appropriate. Whether a 
competing bid arrives during the event period, after the 
event period, or not at all may have an effect on the 
premium and/or the stock price increase at announcement. 
Follow-up studies will also be possible. Many of the 
firms that went private through leveraged buyouts in the 
1980's are now being taken public again. Also, study of 
the factors involved in failure and survival for the sample 
firms would also provide information now that the economy 
has experienced an economic downturn. 
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XION:!IddV 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME NOAYS ANNDAT BUYDAT 
1 A P L CORP 55 860926 861030 
2 AFTER 6 INC 118 840514 840926 
3 AMERACE CORP 92 840619 841112 4 AMERICAN BAKERIES co 61 861022 861204 
5 AMSTAR CORP 121 830929 840208 
6 AXIA CORP 207 840218 841030 7 BECOR WESTERN INC 276 870217 880204 
8 BLUE BELL INC 175 840503 841128 9 C C I CORP 113 820924 830120 10 CAPITOL FOOD INDS INC 131 820827 830120 1 1 CARROLS CORP 92 860925 861222 12 CELLU CRAFT INC 165 830908 840322 13 CENTRAL SOYA INC 70 850314 850509 14 CHADWICK MILLER INC 120 840525 841004 15 CHURCHS FRIED CHICKEN INC 261 881024 890921 16 CLEVEPAK CORP DE 219 850701 860501 
17 CONDEC CORP 194 831114 840701 
18 CONNELLY CONTAINERS l~C 191 890417 891201 19 CONTINENTAL GROUP INC 135 840606 841101 
20 COOK INTERNATIONAL INC 90 841109 850717 2 1 COX COMMUNICATION INC 134 850405 850830 
22 CUNNINGHAM DRUG STORES INC 110 801027 810220 23 DALLAS CORP 69 891 1 t 3 900108 24 DAN RIVER INC 192 821004 830524 
25 DENNVS INC 198 840530 850129 26 DEVON GROUP INC 14 1 820715 821228 
27 DILLINGHAM CORP 115 821116 830317 
28 DURO TEST CORP 18 t 870821 880325 29 DYNCORP 276 870922 880902 30 EASCO CORP 406 850102 860627 31 ECKERD ~ACK CORP 169 851011 860430 32 FIRST CITY BANCORPORATION TX 242 870618 880419 33 FORT HOWARD CORP 117 880622 881024 34 FRUEHAUF CORP 219 860326 861223 35 BENERAL REFRACTORIES CO 403 870306 880824 36 GIFFORD HILL & CO INC 51 860909 861007 37 GOLDEN WEST HOMES 139 851113 860422 38 HARTE HANKS COMMUNICATIONS 145 840328 840911 39 HESSTON CORP 111 870123 870519 40 HORIZON CORP 203 890425 891228 
41 HOSPITAL CORP AMER 157 880915 890316 
42 INSILCO CORP 68 880805 880928 43 INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP 62 870423 870803 44 INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORP NEW 212 870811 880215 ..... 45 .JEWELCOR INC 175 871023 880519 ..... ..... 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME NDAYS ANNDAT BUYDAT 
46 KAISER STEEL CORP 231 830510 840229 
47 KANE MILLER CORP 113 831031 840228 
48 LEAR SIEGLER INC 94 861024 870126 
49 LEHIGH PRESS INC 72 861020 861218 50 LESLIE FAY INC 154 81 1030 820428 
51 LEVI STRAUSS & CO 67 85071 1 850830 
52 LEVITZ FURNITURE CORP 247 840601 840604 53 LOHIMANNS INC too 800925 810107 
54 LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS SYS INC 114 860825 861223 
55 MACY R H & CO INC 215 851021 860715 
5G MAlON[ llo IIYOE INC 54 84060A 84071'} 
57 MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC 140 870713 871215 58 MAXXAM GROUP INC 282 ~ 870526 880520 59 METROMLDIA INC 167 831206 840621 GO MIDLAND GLASS INC 121 831018 840228 61 MIDLAND ROSS CORP 84 860701 860916 62 MORSE SHOE INC 134 870217 870715 63 ,MOUNT VERNON MLS INC 98 820128 82051 1 64 NATIONAL GYPSUM CO 137 851125 860429 65 NATIONAL MINE SVC CO 53 900312 900411 66 NATIONAL SPINNING CO 123 800821 810105 67 NIAGARA FRONTIER SVCS INC 100 830125 830504 68 OHIO MATTRESS CO DE 121 890306 890809 69 PANTASOTE INC 136 ' 890-118 890915 70 PAPERCRAFT CORP 173 850409 851030 
7 1 PARAMOUNT PACKAGING CORP 105 850122 850509 72 PARGAS INC 230 830.217 831202 73 PARSONS CORP 69 840905 841029 74 PAYLESS CASHWAYS INC 115 880609 881007 75 PLANTRONICS INC 115 880804 890301 76 PONDEROSA INC 71 861 124 870122 
71 PURITAN FASHIONS CORP 61 83 1114 831228 78 QUESTOR CORP 174 820322 820928 79 RELIANCE GROUP INC 154 810714 820108 80 RESEARCH COTTRELL INC 54 870608 870710 81 RESTAURANT ASSOCI/I TES I NOS 83 870825 871120 82 REVCO 0 S INC 235 860310 861229 83 REVERE COPPER & BRASS INC 2 11 860320 861204 84 RIEGEL TEXTILE CORP 100 850620 850930 85 ROYAL CROWN COS INC 150 840111 840629 86 SAFEWAY STORES INC 116 860727 86112 4 




The SAS System 
OBS NAME NDAYS ANNDAT BUVDAT 
90 SERVO CORP AMER 336 871211 890228 
91 SHAKLEE CORP GO 890303 890414 
92 SHELLER GLOBE CORP I I I 860214 860611 
93 SIGNODE CORP 157 820301 820827 
94 SOO I I NE CORP 533 880128 900123 
95 SOlHUl[ ~I GN Clli?P 14 011121 020126 
96 SOU rliLAND COI?P 146 870702 811.2 15 
97 STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 212 870916 8802 17 
98 SUSQUEHANNA CORP 137 870916 880217 
99 SVBRON CORP 57 860120 860226 
100 TAFT BROADCASTING CO 179 870306 871006 
101 TElEX CORP 214 871006 880629 
102 TOPPS CHEWING GUM INC 95 031116 640221 
103 TRI SIAlE MTR TRAN CO DE 378 880!l06 90012-1 
104 TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES INC 208 871023 880107 
105 TRIANGLE PACIFIC CORP 53 860304 860404 
106 UNIROYAL INC 148 650409 850924 
107 VALLES STEAK HOUSE 254 8 II 120 821012 
108 VERN! TRON COilP 263 860926 870711 
109 VOLUME MERCHANDISE HJC 101 84061 I 84 1116 
110 WALlER JIM CORP 152 870716 800105 
Ill WARNER COMMIJNJCAIIONS INC 172 890619 900109 
I I ;I WEIMAN INC 10~ 9004'}4 900815 
113 WILLIAMHOUSE REGENCY INC 148 820708 821222 
114 WOMETCO ENTERPRISES INC 172 830922 840412 

















































A P L CORP 
AFTER 6 INC 
AMERACE CORP 
AMERICAN BAKERIES CO 
AMSTAR CORP 
AXIA CORP 
BECOR WESTERN INC 
BLUE BELL INC 
C C I CORP 
CAPITOL FOOD lNOS WC 
CARROLS CORP 
CELLU CRAFT INC 
CENTRAL SOYA INC 
CHADWICK MILLER INC 
CHURCHS rRIEO CHICKEf\i INC 
CLEVEPAK CORP DE 
CONDEC CORP 
CONNELLY CONTAINERS INC 
CONTINENTAL GROUP INC 
COOK INTERNATIONAL INC 
COX COMMUNICATION INC 
CUNNINGHAM DRUG STORES JNC 
DALLAS CORP 
DAN RIVER INC 
DENNYS INC 
DEVON GROUP INC 
Dl LLINGUAM CORr 
DURO TEST CORP 
DYNCORP 
EA'5CO CORP 
ECKERD JACK CORP 
FIRST CITY BANCORPORATJON TX 
FORT HOWARD CORP 
FRUEHAUF CORP 
GENERAL REFRACTORIES r.o 
GIFFORD HILL & CO INC 
GOLDEN WEST IIOMES 
HARTE HANKS COMMUNICATIONS 
fiESSTON CORP 
HORIZON CORP 
HOSPITAL CORP AMER 
INSILCO CORP 
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP 

























































































































































































-- - - -- - ---- - - -- - - ---- - - ---- -
NAME 
KAISER STEEL CORP 
KANE MILLER CORP 
LEAR SIEGLER INC 
LEHIGH PRESS INC 
LESLIE FAY INC 
LEVI STRAUSS & co 
LEVITZ FURNITURE CORP 
LOEHMANNS INC 









LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS SYS INC 
MACY R H & CO INC 
MAl IJNf llo I lVIII I Nf' 
MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC 
MAXXAM GROUP INC 
METROMEDJA INC 
MIDLAND GLASS INC 
MIDLAND ROSS CORP 
MORSE SHOE INC 
MOUNT VERNON MLS INC 
NATIONAL GYPSUM CO 
NATIONAL MINE SVC CO 
NATIONAL SPINNING CO 
NIAGARA FRONTIER SVCS INC 
OHIO MATTRESS CO OE 
PANTASOTE INC 
PAPERCRAFT CORP 
PARAMOUNT PACKAGING CORP 
PARGAS INC 
PARSONS CORP 
PAYLESS CASHWAYS INC 
PLANTRONICS INC 
PONDEROSA INC 
PURITAN FASHIONS CORP 
QUESTOR CORP 
RELIANCE GROUP INC 
RESEARCH COTTRELL INC 
RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES !NOS I 
REVCO D S INC 
REVERE COPPER & BRASS INC 
RIEGEL TEXTILE CORP 
ROYAL CROWN COS INC 
SAFEWAY STORES INC 
SAGE ENERGY CO 
SCOTTYS INC 



























































































































































The SAS System 
NAME 
SERVO CORP AMER 
SHAKLEE CORP 
SHELLER GLOBE CORP 
SIGNOOE CORP 
SOD LINE CORP 
SOUNOESIGN CORP 
SOUTHLAND CORP 
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
SUSQUEHANNA CORP 
SYBRON CORP 
TAFT BROADCASTING CO 
TELEX CORP 
TOPPS CHEWING GUM INC 
TRI STATE MTR TRAN CO DE 
TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES INC 
TRIANGLE PACIFIC CORP 
UNIROYAL INC 
VALLES STEAK HOllSE 
VERNITRON CORP 
VOLUME MERCHANDISE INC 
WALTER JIM CORP 
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 
WEIMAN INC 
WILLIAMHOUSE REGENCY INC 




















































































The SAS System 
OBS NAME CORRL HERf RELPE MGMTOWN LEO 
1 A P L CORP 0 03255 0 OG038 0 57G71 1 1 70 0 2 AFTER 6 INC -o 69745 0 08006 0 406G3 29 50 1 3 AMERACE CORP -0.06883· 0. 18020 0 00749 26. 10 1 4 AMERICAN BAKERIES co 0 91552 0 28133 0 18900 12 50 1 5 AMSTAR CORP 0 4097G 0 28395 0 14912 5 tt 1 G AXIA CORP -o 6275!5 0.28159 0 04G33 5 34 1 1 BECOR WESTERN INC -o 20933 0.18536 0 24.102 1 GO 1 8 BLUE BELL INC 0 52596 0.08006 0 01623 1 6 1 1 9 C C I CORP 0 96842 0 20729 -0 05398 5 13 1 tO CAPITOL FOOD INDS INC -o 39871 0 10162 0 04703 8.30 1 1 1 CARROLS CORP 0 74889 0 15624 0 118G8 32 90 1 12 CELLU CRAFT INC 0 89967 0 14302 -0 34294 42 74 1 13 CENTRAL SOYA INC -o 5Gooo 0 0899G 0 09434 2 90 0 14 CHADWICK MILLER INC 0 83443 0.2G328 0 OG289 59 50 1 15 CHURCHS rRIED CHICKEN INC -0 41228 0 18265 0 03923 5 80 0 1G CLEVEPAK CORP DE -0 16584 0 I 1893 -0 0009G 33.90 0 17 CONDEC CORP 0.06339 o. 14959 0 17063 1 18 CONNELLY CONTAINERS INC 0 78959 0.50000 0 57432- 9 05 I 19 CONTINENTAL GROUP INC 0 39600 0 28004 0 08519 1 42 0 20 COOK INTERNATIONAL INC 0 05821 0.08573 -o 06855 43 45 0 21 COX COMMUNICATION INC 0 98024 0 36365 0, 35151 16 24 0 22 CUNNINGHAM DRUG STORES INC 0 8959G o. 15426 0 05727 14 10 0 23 DALLAS CORP 0.15674 o. 16382 0 09390 9 80 0, 24 DAN RIVER INC 0 74552 0 10847 0 03991 2.G4 0 25 DENNYS INC 0 94875 0. 15624. 0 1 1868 10.00 1 2G DEVON GROUP INC 0.93439 0.46530 0 06300 4 60 1 27 DILLINGHAM CORP 0 30693 0.23453 0 05395 2 60 0 28 DURO TEST CORP 0 42433 0.26222 0 18161 7 40 0 29 •DYNCORP 0.71372 0.30425 0 20550 1 30 EASCO CORP 0 36082 0. 18607 0 15708 3 G9 0 3 1 ECKERD ~ACK CORP 0 9G243 0 20625 0 09408 9 00 1 32 FIRST CITY BANCORPORATION TX -o 96550 0 03743 -0 00041 10 73 0 33 FORT HOWARD CORP 0 92988 0 09404 0 08628 6 50 I 34 FRUEHAUF CORP -o 3G292 0.20729 -o 05398 1 35 GENERAL REFRACTORIES CO -o 00820 0.28264 0 58966 42. 10 1 36 GIFFORD HILL 6 CO INC 0.67581 0 14974 2 83879 15.50 0 37 GOLDEN WEST HOMES -0.70358 0.19615 0 09397 32 70 0 38 HARTE HANKS COMMUNICATIONS 0.95604 o. 13077 0 07543 28 28 1 39 HESSTON CORP -0 68488 0.29410 ·0 01247 11 GO 0 40 HORIZON CORP -0 51945 0.06378 -o oo244 61 80 0 4 1 HOSPITAL CORP AMER 0.98038 o. 16407 0 04266 2.60 t 42 INSILCO CORP 0.26526 0.21713 0.11836 t. 25 0 43 INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP 0.853!52 o. 15745 0 09522 19.00 1 44 INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORP NEW -0.73838 0.38402 0 23877 29.90 1 ...... 45 ~EWELCOR INC 0.79608 0.20475 0 07105 31.50 1 ...... 
-...) 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME CORRL HERF RELPE MGMTOWN LED 46 KAISER STEEL CORP -o. 16556 0.08525 0.41371 3.50 0 47 KANE MILLER CORP -0.63556 o. t7160 0.06443 48 LEAR SIEGLER INC 0.88843 o. 11046 0 00963 3.88 0 49 LEHIGH PRESS INC 0.69078 0.31277 0.05480 27.40 1 50 lESLIE FAY INC -o. 13593 0.07106 0.01087 30.00 1 51 LEVI STRAUSS & CO 0.04978 0. 11137 0.03779 20.00 I 52 LEVITZ FURNITURE CORP 0.58142 0.59618 ' 11580 3.60 0 53 LOEHMANNS INC 0.82636 o. 19763 0 25229 54 LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS SYS INC 0.43977 0.11046 0 01510 3 20 0 55 MACY R H & CO INC 0.99438 0 23263 0 04255 2.90 1 r,r, MAIONr Ro IIYOF. JNr. 0 7~1!H; 0 t7 :;1?4 0 Hi071 15 to 1 57 MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC -0.98103 0 03743 0 00834 0. 70 0 58 MAXXAM GROUP INC -0.81148 0 59t50 -0.92094 37 50 0 59 METROMEDIA INC 0.96991 0.36365 0 39545 27 41 1 60 MIDLAND GLASS INC 0 21014 0 31567 1 89628 67 73 0 61 MIDLAND ROSS CORP -0.09805 0 11944 0 03614 2.35 0 62 MORSE SHOE INC -o 46039 0.45466 0 68551 13 29 1 63 MOUNT VERNON MLS INC 0.38654 0 08853 0 01821 59 92 0 64 NATIONAL GYPSUM CO 0.50630 0.27493 0.13568 I. 10 1 65. NATIONAL MINE SVC CO 0.44585 0.13538 0 00797 1 .00 0 66 NATIONAL SPINNING CO 0.00401 0.08520 0 01857 30. tO 1 67 NIAGARA FRONTIER SVCS INC 0.92995 0 08537 0 00776 26 10 0 68 OHIO MATTRESS CO DE 0. 77565 o. 23028 0 10722 20 67 1 69 PANTASOTE INC 0.26615 0 19567 0 02913 54.38 0 70 PAPERCRAFf CORP 0.47911 0 57476 0. t0728 14.00 I 




The SAS Syatem 
OBS NAME COPrtL HERF RELPE MGMTOWN LEO 
90 SERVO CORP AMER 0.69846 0.30178 0 04928 38 80 t 
91 SHAKLEE CORP -0 05599 0 06437 0 00344 28 90 1 
92 SHELLER GLOBE CORP -o 59393 0 20729 -o 05398 3.90 t 
93 SIGNODE CORP 0 92896 0 07770 0 01865 9 00 1 
94 SOD LINE CORP 0 59199 0 13895 -o 10412 t 0 t 0 
!15 SOIJNOF SIGN CORP -o ?G075 0 1:107?. 0 1511!i6 ?A llO 1 
96 SOUTHLAND CORP 0.811895 0 08537 0 020!38 4 to 0 
97 STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 0 93560 0 36365 0 19772 4.60 0 
98 SUSQUEHANNA CORP -o ot604 0 12998 0 02673 t 00 0 
99 SYBRON CORP 0 26800 0 24608 0 06210 2.20 0 
tOO TAFT.BROADCASTING CO -0.06721 0 36365 1 19732 1 
101 TELEX CORP 0 66633 0 22874 0 01313 0 
102 TOPPS CHEWING GUM INC 0.06942 0 28395 0 12277 20 19 0 
103 TRI STATE MTR TRAN CO DE 0 59510 0 24730 -o o5 t t6 9 83 0 
104 TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES INC 0 05925 0 25658 0 08870 30 to 0 
105 TRIANGLE PACIFIC CORP 0. 3791 t 0.37401 0 05376 7 90 0 
106 UNIROYAL INC 0. 3 1 t 94 0 20133 0 07650 t 58 1 
107 VALLES STEAK HOUSE 0 07669 0 12395 0 18313 58 60 t 
tOO VERNITRON CORP 0 04977 0 30770 0 08627 7 00 0 
10!3 VOLUME MERCHANDISE INC 0 73741 0 50974 0 41474 54 30 0 
110 WALTER JIM CORP 0 25326 0 12998 0 02154 2 66 ·1 
111 WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 0 30935 0 35522 1 14946 2 00 0 
117 WFTMAN INC -o 54503 0 25148 0 01438 38 ,30 ' 113 WILLIAMHOUSE REGENCY INC 0.86259 0 60024 0 09238 26 64 0 
t t 4 WOMETCO ENTERPRISES INC 0.95361 0 15094 0 07981 33 00 0 
t I 5 ZALE CORP 0.57771 0.37064 0 44335 37 95 0 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME CHOW TAXLIAB COMPBIO OWN LED TAXGRP 
1 A P L CORP 4 743 -o 04220 t 0 00 t 2 AFTER 6 INC -0.031 0.04654 0 29 50 1 3 AMERACE CORP 3.665 0 05810 0 26 10 1 4 AMERICAN BAKERIES co t6.836 0 06184 0 t2 50 1 5 AMSTAR CORP 28.706 0 21840 0 5 11 1 6 AXIA CORP -2.390 0 10176 t 5 34 t 7 BECOR WESTERN INC -26.280 0. 11630 t 1 60 2 8 BLUE BELL INC 32.607 o. t3131 0 1 61 1 9 C C I CORP 15.786 o. t9549 0 5 13 1 tO CAPITOL FOOD INDS INC 0 326 0. 16452 0 8 30 1 1 t CARROLS CORP 4.778 O.t2116 0 32.90 1 12 CELLU CRAFT INC 3.291 0.23633 0 42 74 1 13 CENTRAL SOYA INC tO 884 0 03826 t 0 00 t 14 CHADWICK MILLER INC 0. 823 0 09598 0 59 50 1 15 CHURCHS FRIED CHICKEN INC 0.01193 t 0 00 2 t6 CLEVEPAK CORP DE -o 780 0 05466 1 0 00 1 t7 CDNDEC CORP 0 242 -o 01646 t 1 18 CONNELLY CONTAINERS INC 3 279 0 09822 0 9 05 2 19 CONTINENTAL GROUP INC t88 802 0 01882 1 0 00 t 20 COOK INTERNATIONAL INC -5 14 4 0 t840t 0 0 00 t 2 t COX COMMUNICATION INC 64 406 0 06425 0 0 00 t 22 CUNNI NGI 111M DRUG S I ORE<; INC 0 03726 0 0 00 t 23 DALLAS CORP to 3G6 0 06174 0 0 00 2 24 DAN RIVER INC 22 544 0 03870 t 0 00 t 25 DENNYS INC 43 527 0 09101 0 tO 00 t 26 DEVON GROUP INC 7 t 1 1 0 09840 0 4 60 t 27 DilliNGHAM CORP t6 488 0 05946 0 0 00 t 28 DURO TEST CORP 2 886 0 09167 t 0 00 2 29 OYNCORP 0.04099 t 2 30 EASCO CORP t3 027 0 03536 1 0 00 1 3t ECKERD JACK CORP 55 054 0 08169 0 9 00 1 32 FIRST CITY BANCORPORATION TX -62 580 0 00223 0 0 00 2 33 FORT HOWARD CORP t85 850 0 07900 0 6 50 2 34 FRUEHAUF CORP - 1 t 863 0 0628t t t 35 GENERAL REFRACTORIES CO 12 807 0 10079 0 42 10 2 36 GIFFORD HILL & CO INC 64 670 0 03961 0 0 00 t 37 GOLDEN WEST HOMES 0 000 -o 04325 0 0 00 I 38 HARTE HANKS COMMUNICATIONS 24 969 0 t2475 t 28 28 t 39 IIESSTON CORP -41 175 -001173 0 0 00 2 40 HORIZON CORP -26 367 -o 42023 0 0 00 2 4 t HOSPITAL CORP AMER 114 936 0.21372 1 2 60 2 42 INSILCO CORP eo 569 0 05518 1 0 00 2 43 INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP 9 808 0 16728 t 19 00 2 44 INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORP NEW 4 232 -0 0066!5 0 29 90 2 
t--' 45 .JEWELCOR INC 3 048 0 05864 t 31 so 2 t-.) 
0 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME CFLOW UXLIAB COMPBID OWN LED TAXGRP 
46 KAISE~ STEEL CORP -10.222 -o 18105 0.00 I 47 KANE MILLER CORP 9.737 0 02083 1 48 LEAR SIEGLER INC 10!5 738 0 11199 I o.oo I 49 LEHIGH PRESS INC 7 342 0 01760 0 27 40 1 50 LESLIE FAY INC 0 000 0 10173 0 30 00 I 51 LEVI STRAUSS & CO 67 095 0 17301 0 20 00 I 52 LEVITZ FURNITURE CORP 13 856 0 02052 1 0 00 I 53 LOFHM.UINS INC 3 863 0.22870 1 54 LYNCH COMMUNICATIONS SYS INC 3 656 0.07947 0 0 00 I 55 MhCY R H & CO INC 114 048 0 12510 0 2 90 I SG MfiLONF. & HYDE INC 20 278 0 14899 0 15. 10 I 
57 MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC -65 505 0 02900 0 0 00 2 58 MAXXAM GROUP INC -76.117 -0 01141 0 0 00 2 59 METROMEDIA INC 57.852 -o 17905 0 27 41 I 60 MIDLAND GLASS INC 9.546 -0 04052 0 0 00. f 61 MIDLAND ROSS CORP t .010 0.15134 0 0.00 f 62 MORSE SHOE INC 8.422 0.02893 I 13 29 2 63 MOUNT VERNON MLS INC 4.029 0 07042 0 0 00 1 64 NATIONAL GYPSUM CO 126.459 0.05747 1 I 10 1 65 NATIONAL MINE SVC CO 0.000 0.03713 0 0 00 .2 66 NATIONAL SPINNING CO 4 059 0 04349 0 30 10 I 67 NIAGARA FRONTIER SVCS INC 9.525 o. 15942 0 0.00 1 68 OHIO MATTRESS CO DE 33 421 0.00127 0 20 67 2 69 PANTASOTE INC 7 764 0 28701 0 0 00 2 10 PAPERCRAFT CORP 5.750 0 11956 0 14 00 f 71 PARAMOUNT PACKAGING CORP -0.298 0 05548 0 0 00 1 72 PARGAS INC 20.218 0 11377 I 0 00 f 73 PARSONS CORP 6.787 0.21903 f 3 37 1 74 PAYLESS CASHWAYS INC 18 389 0.06783 0 I 57 2 75 PLANTRONICS INC 8.849 0.12516 0 3 20 2 76 PONDEROSA INC 20.299 0.00049 0 0 00 1 77 PURITAN FASHIONS CORP 10 134 0 29932 0 0 00 I 78 QUESTOR CORP 21.214 0 06404 0 0 00 1 79 RELIANCE GROUP INC 141.920 -0.13371 0 42 23 1 80 RESEARCH COTTRELL INC 16 023 0 05949 0 0 00 2 81 RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES INDS 3.089 0 02108 I 29 01 2 82 REVCO D S INC 46.203 0 05209 1 3.90 1 83 REVERE COPPER & BRASS INC 60 759 0 04166 1 3 50 1 84 RIEGEL TEXTILE CORP 34.846 -0.00865 0 0 00 1 85 ROYAL CROWN COS INC 19 965 0.09601 I 0 00 1 86 SAFEWAY STORES INC 307.201 0 07538 0 0.00 f 87 SAGE ENERGY CO 11.111 -o 01474 0 70 96 2 88 SCOTTYS INC 115.181 0 03065 0 0.00 2 89 SELIGMAN & LATZ INC 3.846 0.05891 0 0 00 1 f-1 
N 
f-1 
The SAS System 
OBS NAME CFLOW TAXLIAB COMPBID OWNLEO TAXGRP 
90 SERVO CORP AMER 0.571 -0.02705 0 38.80 2 91 SHAKLEE CORP 38.389 0. 12567 1 28.90 2 92 SHELLER GLOBE CORP 14.924 0.11710 0 3.90 1 93 SIGNOOE CORP 32.429 o. 10297 0 9.00 1 
94 SOD LINE CORP 29.728 0.03835 1 O;OO 2 95 SOUNDESIGN CORP 1 870 0 02389 0 28 60 1 96 SOUTHLAND CORP 124.235 0.02728 1 0 00 2 
97 STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC 39.026 2 77214 t 0 00 2 98 SUSQUEHANNA CORP 4.588 -o o1as8 0 o.oo 2 99 SYBRON CORP 22.863 o. 13443 0 0.00~ 1 
100 TAFT BROADCASTING CO 2~.255 -o. 14467 1 2 tot 'TELEX CORP 17.807 0. 21.873 1 2 t02 TOPPS CHEWING GUM INC 4.442 0 27152 0 0 00 1 103 TRI STATE MTR TRAN CO DE 0 08531 1 0 00 2 104 TRIANGLE INDUSTRIES INC -4 965 0 44714 0 0 00 2 105 TRIANGLE PACIFIC CORP 14.774 0.09854 0 0 00 1 106 UNIROYAL INC 136.889 0.04677 1 1 58 t 
107 VALLES STEAK HOUSE t .868 0.02973 0 58 60 1 
108 VERNITRON CORP ~1 225 0.05264 0 0 00 1 t09 VOLUME MERCHANDISE INC 1 814 -0.06727 1 0 00 1 110 WilL TER JIM CORP 159 148 0.05345 0 2 66 2 111 WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC 339.358 0 06688 0 0 00 2 It;) WfiMIIN INC -0 71R 0 0170? 0 1A 30 ' 113 WILLIAMHOUSE REGENCY INC 9.917 o. 13886 0 0 I 114 WOMETCO ENTERPRISES INC 30.916 0.03t60 0 0 1 I 15 ZALE CORP 33.978 0.03235 0 0 1 
The SAS System 
Correlation 
CORR CORRL HERF RELPE MGMTOWN LED 
CORRL 1 0000 0 1187 0.0737 -o 0856 0. 1403 
HERF 0 1187 1 0000 0 1810 0 0923 -0 0209 
RELPE 0 0737 0 1810 1.0000 0 0863 -o 1513 
MGMTOWN -0 0856 0 0923 0 0863 1 0000 0 0492 
LED 0 1403 -o 0209 -0.1513 0 0492 I 0000 
CFLOW 0 2599 -o 0499 0 1752 -o 2814 0 0459 
TAXLIAB o. 1751 0 0843 -0.0551 -o 1324 -o 0463 
CDMPBID 0. tOSS -0.0498 -0.0117 -o 2614 -0 0442 
OWNLED 0 0594 -o 0222 -0.0895 0 5282 0 6344 
ANUPREM 0 0646 0 1452 0 1114 -o 19 11 0 0233 
CORR CHOW IAXLIAB CDMPBID OWNLED ANUPREM 
CORRL 0 2599 0 1751 0 1058 0 0594 0 0646 
HERF -0 0499 0.0843 -o 0490 -0 0222 -0 1452 
RELPE 0. 1752 -0.0551 -0 0117 -o 0895 0 1114 
MGMTOWN -0 2814 -o 1324 -o 2614 0 5282 -o 1911 
LED 0 0459 -o o463 -o 0442 0 6344 0 0233 
CFLOW I 0000 0.0182 0. 1002 -o 1032 0. 1219 
TAXLIAB 0 0182 1 0000 0 1228 -o 0857 0 0112 
COMPBID 0 1002 0 1228 I 0000. -o 1636 0 0227 
OWNLED -0 1032 -o 0857 -o 1636 I 0000 . -o 0626 
ANUPREM 0 1219 0 0172 0 0227 -o 0626 1 0000 
The SAS System 
------------------------------------------------------------- TAXGRP•1 -----------------------------------------------------------
Correlation 
CORR CORRL HERF RELPE MGMTOWN LED 
CORRL I 0000 0 2320 0 0233 -o 0627 0 0729 
HERF 0 2320 1 0000 0 1873 0 0704 -0.0742 
RELPE 0 0233 0 1873 1 0000 0 1930 -0 2659 
MGMTOWN -0 0627 0 0704 0 1930 1 0000 -0.0381 
LEO 0 0729 -o 0742 -0.2659 -0.0381 1.0000 
CFLDW 0.0941 -o 0407 0 0162 -o 28oo 0.0287 
TAXLIAB 0 1183 -o 1169 -0 3465 -o 1688 0 1486 
COMPBID -0.0260 -0 0153 -0.0245 -o 2883 -0 1355 
DWNLED 0 0283 -o 1284 -0 1506 0 4509 0 6332 
ANUPREM -0 0190 -0 0186 0 2103 -o 2251 0 0001 
CORR CFLOW TAXLIAB COMPBID OWNLED ANUPREM 
CORRL 0 0941 () 1183 -o 02GO 0 0283 -o 0190 
HERF -o 0407 -o 1169 -o 0153 -o 1284 -o 0186 
RELPE 0 0162 -o 3465 -o 0245 -o 1506 0 2103 
fJIGMlOWN -o 2800 -o 1688 -o 2883 0 4509 -o 2251 
LED 0 0287 0 1486 -0 1355 0 6332 0 0001 
CFLOW 1 0000 -o 1290 0 1245 -0 0983 0 1209 
T AXLI All -o 1290 I 0000 -o 2049 -o 0586 0. 1002 
COMPBID 0.1245 -o 2049 I 0000 -o 2678 -0.1581 
OWNtED -0.0983 -0 0586 -0 2678 1 0000 -o 1214 
ANIJPREM 0. 1209 0 1002 -o 1581 -0 1214 1.0000 
The SAS System 
------------------------------------------------------------- TAXGRP=2 -------------------------------------------------------------
Correlation 
CORR CORRL ~IERF RELPE MGMTOWN LEO 
CORRL 1 0000 -o 0367 o. 1551 -o 1360 0.2596 
HERF -0.0367 1 0000 o. 1934 0 1368 0.0766 
RELPE o. 1551 0 1934 1 0000 --o 2030 o. 1619 
MGMTOWN -o. 1360 0 1368 -o 2030 1 0000 0.2124 
LEO 0.2596 0 0766 0.1619 0 2124 1.0000 
CFLOW 0.4364 -o 06o5 0 4983 -0 2963 0.0717 
TAXLIAB 0.2649 0 1817 0 0734 -o 1646 -0. 1392 
COMPBID 0.3285 -o. t 193 0.0418 -o 2103 o. 1 179 
OWNLED o: 1245 0. 1405 0 0650 0 6622 0.6415 
ANUPREM 0. 1541 -0.3190 -0 0745 -0 1528 0.0575 
CORR CHOW TAXLJAB COMPBID OWNLED ANUPREM 
CORRL 0.4364 0 2649 0 3285 0 1245 o. 1541 
HERF -0.0605 0 1817 -0. 1193 0 1405 -0.3190 
RELPE 0.4983 0 0734 0 0418 0 0650 -0.0745 
MGMTOWN -0.2963 -0 1646 -0 2103 0 6622 -o. 1528 
LED 0.0717 -o 1392 0. t 179 0 6415 0.0575 
CFLOW 1 .0000 0.0618 0 0784 -o 1065 0. 1216 
TAXLIAB 0.0618 1 .0000 0.2709 -o 1301 0.0029 
COMPBJO 0.0784 0.2709 1 0000 -o 0139 0.2646 
OWNLED -0. 1065 -0. 1301 -0.0139 I 0000 0 0100 
ANUPREM 0.1216 0.0029 0.2646 0 0100 1.0000 
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